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STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS:
ITS ORIGINS, RATIONALE AND EFFECT ON
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
RICHARD R. PIERSON*
"There is no position which depends on clearer principles
than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the
tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void."
The Federalist, No. 78
I. INTRODUCTION
More than one hundred thousand contracts were awarded by the
federal government in 1968, and procurement actions in that year alone
represented commitments to expend over fifty billion dollars.' Virtually
all of these contracts are entered into under authority delegated by
statute from Congress to a department in the executive branch of the
government. Usually, the contracts are awarded to private industry
under the authority of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 8
or the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. 8
Both statutes are implemented by volumes of procurement regulations
which prescribe the authority and obligations of the public officials
who enter into contracts on behalf of the government. 4
 These procure-
ment regulations, if reasonably adapted to the administration of a
* BA., Duke University, 1955; LL.B., Columbia University, 1960. The author is on
the staff of the General Counsel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). The views expressed herein are his own. They are not intended to and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Administrator, the General Counsel, or the author's
colleagues on the staff of the General Counsel.
1
 Hearings on H.R. 474 before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 222, 394, 403. See also Cibincc and Lasken, The
Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 349, 387, n.183
(1970).
2 10	 H 2301-14 (1964).
8 41 U.S.C. { 251-60 (1964).
4
 Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), 32 C.F.R. pts. 1-39; Federal
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congressional act, have the force and effect of law. ° Generally, the pro-
curement statutes and regulations provide that advertising for bids is
the preferred method of procurement, - that invitations for bids shall
be designed to permit full and free competition, and that the award
of advertised contracts shall be made to the lowest responsible, re-
sponsive bidder. In addition, the statutes and regulations provide that
in certain circumstances the government may enter into contracts by
negotiation. In a negotiated procurement, the limitations on the con-
tracting officer's authority are far less stringent than those prescribed
for advertised bidding. Negotiated, contracts, notwithstanding the
statutory preference for advertising, account for approximately eighty-
seven percent of the total government expenditures for procurement .°
The act of contract formation, if contrary to the tenor of the
authority delegated to the contracting officer by statute or regulation,
is void and creates no binding obligation.? Thus, government con-
tractors have not been successful in their attempts to have courts
uphold a contract or agreement entered into by an agent of the gov-
ernment which exceeds the amount appropriated for that purpose
by Congress, which involves a lease with a term longer than the period
specified in the appropriation, which does not have the required ap-
proval of a superior officer, which is not negotiated in accordance with
applicable rules and regulations, or which includes terms the agent had
no authority to accept.8 Remarkable, therefore, is the fact that contrac-
tors have been equally unsuccessful in their attempts to have federal
courts void contracts awarded by unauthorized actions of government
officials. Generally, these suits are initiated by offerors who unsuccess-
fully competed for the contract and who might have received the
award had government contracting officers complied with the applicable
procurement statutes and regulations. In denying relief, federal courts
have consistently held that disappointed competitors have no standing
to sue, that is, that the procurement statutes confer no enforceable
rights on private litigants .° In one case, a court observed:
The relief sought by plaintiffs creates great policy prob-
lems and brings into play the distinctionS between powers of
Procurement Regulations (FPR), 41 C.F.R. 1-1.00 et seq.; National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Procurement Regulations (NASAPR), 41 C.F.R. ch. 18-1-52.
5 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 255 (1963) ; Schoenbrod v. United States, 410
F.2d 400, 403 (Ct. CL 1969).
6 Hearings on H.R. 474 before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 222, 394.
7 See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Sutton v.
United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921) ; Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct.
CL 1963).
See, Nash and Cibinic, Fed. Proc. Law, 2d ed., ch. 2, § 2; ch. 3, f¢ 1, 2 and cases
cited therein.
•• 9 See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
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government. It does not require much imagination to antic-
ipate the chaos which would be caused if the bidding pro-
cedure under every government contract was subject to review
by courts to .ascertain if it was fairly and properly done, and
the corresponding damage and delay which would be done to
government business if the injunctive power of the court was
used to stay contractual activities pending judicial review."
Recently, however, in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shafter, 11
the doctrine that unsuccessful bidders have no standing to sue was
greatly relaxed if not abandoned. The plaintiff, the second lowest and
unsuccessful bidder for a government contract, urged that it had
standing to challenge the validity of the contract awarded to its com-
petitor, and, upon proof of illegality, to have the contract cancelled.
The court sustained Scanwell's argument and concluded that the bidder
had standing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." The
court reasoned that Scanwell was a "private attorney general," and,
therefore, could vindicate a public interest by seeking cancellation of
an allegedly illegal contract. The significance of this holding lies in the
possibility that every unsuccessful offeror who formerly had no stand-
ing under the procurement statutes to contest the validity of a govern-
ment contract may now assume the status of a "private attorney
general" and challenge each contract that the government awards or
proposes to award.
This article will examine the Scanwell decision, as well as the
decisions prior to and after Scanwell which bear on the issue of stand-
ing in government contract cases. The article accepts the premise that
fairness to competitors injured by the unauthorized acts of 'contracting
officers is best assured by permitting them to sue the federal govern-
ment. However, it will be demonstrated that suits under the present
APA treat successful contractors unfairly and will adversely affect
economy and efficiency in government. More importantly, it will be
demonstrated that particularly damaging consequences to government
operations will result from law suits challenging negotiated contracts
which are associated with important national goals. With respect to
these contracts, the article will review certain decisions by the Comp-
troller General of the United States, whose office is the only "quasi-
judicial" forum, and until Scanwell, the only forum to which an un-
successful offeror could apply for relief." An examination of these
decisions will suggest that the wide latitude of authority. which 'a
10
 Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182, 186 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
11
 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
12 Id. at 864.
10
 For the authority of the Comptroller General in reviewing the award of govern-
ment contracts, see note 45, infra.
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government contracting officer enjoys when he negotiates a contract
will not bar successful law suits by those who are granted standing
to sue. Finally, the article will propose an amendment to existing
legislation which would permit unsuccessful offerors to sue while, at
the same time, avoid the undesirable consequences now associated with
such suits.
II. STANDING TO CONTEST GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS:
THE PRE-Scanwell DECISIONS
The landmark decision on the standing of unsuccessful bidders to
contest the validity of contracts awarded by the federal government is
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 14 decided in 1940. At issue was a pro-
vision in the Walsh-Healey Act" requiring sellers to agree to pay their
employees who were engaged in producing goods for sale to the gov-
ernment not less than a minimum wage as determined by the Secretary
of Labor." The plaintiffs, prospective bidders, sought review of certain
wage determinations by the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the
determinations were the result of erroneous statutory interpretation. Mr.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that the plaintiffs had
no standing to challenge the administrative action of the Secretary
since neither Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes'? nor the Walsh-
Healy Act" conferred any enforceable rights upon prospective bidders.
The Court emphasized that the statutes which govern the award
of government contracts were enacted by Congress to impose a duty
upon government officers alone and are only for the protection of the
general public. "The Secretary's responsibility is to superior executive
and legislative authority. Respondents have no standing in court to
enforce that responsibility or to represent the public's interest in the
Secretary's compliance with the Act."" In further enunciating the
14 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
15 41 U.S.C. Ili 35-45 (1964).
18 41 U.S.C. § 35 (b) provides:
That all persons employed by the contractor in the manufacture or furnishing
of the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment used in the performance of the
contract will be paid . . . not less than the minimum wages as determined by
the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed
on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of industries
currently operating in the locality in which the materials, supplies, articles or
equipment are to be manufactured or furnished under said contract.
17 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1964). This is the unrepealed precursor of the more current and
now much more significant procurement statutes, i.e., Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947, 10 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (1964), and the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C. § 251-60 (1964). NASA generally conducts its procurement in ac-
cordance wih the Act of 1947. See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub.
L. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1964), and 10 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (1964).
18 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
19 310 U.S. at 129.
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rationale underlying its decision that potential bidders have no right
to challenge government procurement actions, the Court noted that:
Courts should not, where Congress has not done so, subject
purchasing agencies . . . to the delays necessarily incident to
judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sellers. . .. A like
restraint applied to purchasing by private business would be
widely condemned as an intolerable business handicap. It is,
as both Congress and the courts have always recognized, es-
sential to the even and expeditious functioning of Govern-
ment that the administration of the purchasing machinery
be unhampered."
Nevertheless, the case for judicial review of the government pro-
curement process is not difficult to construct. Since the passage of the
basic procurement statutes in 1947 and 1949, the federal budget has
risen from $40 billion to over $156 billion. 21 During the same period,
government procurement expenditures have increased from $9 billion
to $55 billion.22 As a result of these increased expenditures, more
individuals are affected by or involved in the procurement process and
these people are becoming increasingly concerned about whether that
process is administered fairly and in accordance with the relevant
statutes and regulations, rather than in accordance with the well-in-
tentioned desires of a government department or agency. The need
for judicial review to satisfy this public concern was described by
Judge Tamm in Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig,23 one of several recent
decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on
the subject of standing to challenge the award of government contracts:
Frequently the motivation of challenged agency action
is neither caitiff nor paltry, with the result that the purity of
doctrine and the nobility of purpose tend to narcotize com-
pletely the searches for legal authorization. The unfortunate
result is euphemistic in that the legal wolf is effectively dis-
guised in an emotionally appealing wool. Courts are therefore
confronted with the problem of insuring that the idealistic
objectives of brave but congressionally unauthorized action,
ostensibly undertaken pursuant to a "public interest" pro-
vision, are legally bottomed upon something more than a
Bourbon Monarch's "L'Etat—c'est Moi.""
20
 Id. at 130.
21 Data compiled from U.S. Treasury Dept. Ann. Rep. of the Secretary (1946-
1969).
22 Id.
23 No. 22, 799 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1970).
24 Id. at 8, 9.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Ironically, the Supreme Court's decision in Perkins reversed the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which, thirty years later
in Scanwell, again held that unsuccessful bidders have standing to
sue. During those thirty years both Congress and the courts became
increasingly more receptive to claims against administrative agencies.
In 1946, Congress passed the APA which provides that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial relief thereof." 22 Since the passage of the APA,
the Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended to broaden
the concept of standing in the area of judicial review of administrative
actions. The Court has noted that " [t]he legislative material eluci-
dating that seminal act [APA] manifests a congressional intention
that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions. . . ." 2° Fur-
thermore, the Court has also held that the purpose of a statute may
indicate that "aggrieved" persons have standing to contest adminis-
trative action independent of the APA. 27 On one occasion, the Court
stated that in view of the congressional intent in enacting the APA,
judicial review of administrative actions should not be restricted unless
there is clear and convincing evidente of a contrary legislative intent. 28
Despite these pronouncements by the Supreme Court, however, none
of its decisions had held that the APA alone, without an assist from
the statute or constitutional guarantee allegedly violated, provided
standing to contest the illegal actions of administrative agencies.
Moreover, until Scanwell, federal courts have, with few exceptions,
followed the Perkins rationale that an unsuccessful bidder for a gov-
ernment contract has no standing to complain. 22
The decision cited no less frequently than Perkins for the prop-
osition that unsuccessful bidders lack standing to sue is Friend v.
Lee,R° decided in 1955. This action involved an invitation for bids by
28 5 U.S.C. if 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1970).
25 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
27
 See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), in which Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, and mindful of his earlier decision in Perkins, stated that an
explicit statutory provision conferring standing is unnecessary when the purpose of the
act allegedly violated is to protect competitors such as the plaintiff. See also, Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
29 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
29 Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967) ; United
States v. Gray Line Water Tours of Charleston, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Friend
v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1948) ; Walter P. Villere Co. v; Blinn, 156 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1946). See also Lind
v. Staats, supra note 10; United States v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1964) ; Heyer
Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956). Also cf. Gonzalez v. Freeman,
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d
368 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Contra, see Contractors Ass'n v. Schultz, CA. No. 70-18 (ED. Pa.
March 13, 1970).
210 221 Kid 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) for a three-year exclu-
sive car rental concession at Washington Airport. The contract ulti-
mately was awarded to Avis. Friend, doing business as Hertz Driv-Ur-
Self System, brought an action against the CAA alleging .that the
procurement had not been conducted in accordance with the rules of
formal advertising, as set forth in regulations promulgated under the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949." Friend
also alleged that the CAA was tortiously interfering with the conduct
of its business by restricting its use of the public facilities at the
airport.
With respect to the procurement issue, the court held that the
plaintiff had no standing to sue. It stated:
Statutes regulating the contracting procedures of the Federal
Government are enacted solely for the benefit of the Govern-
ment and confer no enforceable rights upon persons dealing '
with it.... In consequence, plaintiff cannot contest the award
,
of the contract to Avis, either as a bidder or in his capacity'
as a citizen generally .... Contracting officers of the Federal
Government have the duty to select the contract most ad-
vantageous to the Government. • . . The final selection of a
contractor involves discretion and is not subject to review
by the judicial branch of the Government."
The court did, however, hold that the plaintiff had standing to sue
on the claim of tortious interference." It was satisfied that the plain-
tiff had made a sufficient showing that the regulations imposed by the
CAA on the delivery of its cars to the airport were capricious and
arbitrary. "Where there is a threat of injury resulting from capricious
or arbitrary performance of the regulatory functions of a government
agency, the Federal courts have . . . been ready to grant relief.""
Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 36 decided the year after
Friend, represents the first cautious departure from the Perkins ra-
tionale. In Heyer, the plaintiff alleged that the procurement was not
conducted in accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947" which provided that contract "[a} wards shall be made .. .
81 41 U.S.C. ft 251-60 (1964).
82 221 F.2d at 100.
83 The court in Scanwell weakly distinguishes the Friend case on the basis that the
plaintiff in Friend did not specifically allege that the government acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. Moreover, in support of its position, the Scanwell court places
considerable reliance on the second holding in Friend, that the plaintiff had standing to
sue on his claim of tortious interference, a holding that had nothing to do with whether
an unsuccessful bidder can sue to cancel a contract.
84 221 F.2d at 102.
85 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
86 10 U.S.C. fi 2301-14 (1964).
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to the responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and
will be the most advantageous to the United States, price and other
factors considered. . . . 87
 The plaintiff suing for bid preparation costs
and lost profits impressed the court with its showing of possible dis-
criminatory action by the government agency in awarding the contract.
Among other things, the court observed that the fact that the contract
was awarded to a bidder whose bid was higher than six others, and
was awarded at a price almost twice that of the low bid, "makes one
strongly suspect discrimination and favoritism and a failure to accept
that bid which was most advantageous to the Government, as [the
agency] was required to do. . . . "38
Despite these suspicions, the court granted the government's
motion to dismiss insofar as it pertained to the claim for lost profits.
The decision was based on the Perkins rationale that the procurement
statutes were enacted for the benefit of the public and were not in-
tended to confer any enforceable rights on individual bidders. Even
if the Act were violated, the court emphasized, "it is only the public
who has a cause for complaint, and not an unsuccessful bidder."'
However, the court did hold that the plaintiff had a legal right
to recover his bid preparation expenses if the facts as alleged were
proved. The court reached this result by implying an obligation on
the part of the government to consider both fairly and honestly all
bids submitted4° Furthermore, the court stated that all contractors
who incur expenses in preparing bids for submission have a right to
expect that only that bid which is "most advantageous" to the Govern-
ment will be accepted. However, on this point, the court stressed that:
Recovery can be had in only those cases where it can be
shown by clear and convincing proof that there has been a
fraudulent inducement for bids, with the intention, before the
bids were invited or later conceived, to disregard them all
except the ones from bidders to one of whom it was intended
to let the contract, whether he was the lowest responsible
bidder or not.41
87 10 U.S.C. * 2305(c) (1964).
88 140 F. Supp. at 410.
89 Id. at 412.
49 For a critical comment on the implied contract theory enunciated in Heyer, see
56 Cotum. L. Rev. 1239 (1956) ; also, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 373 (1957).
41 140 F. Supp. at 414. Until the Scanwell decision, the Heyer precedent had not
proved helpful to plaintiffs seeking recovery of bid preparation expenses. See Robert F.
Simmons & Associates v. United States, 360 F.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; Trans International
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ; Green Manor Const. Co.
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 413 (1965) ; Iscow v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 875 (1963) ;
Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. CL 837 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815
(1961) ; Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. Cl. 1959). Cf. Keco
Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 173-69 (Ct. Cl. July 15, 1970).
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The court, in allowing the plaintiff to recover his bid preparation ex-
penses departed from the Perkins rationale inasmuch as it held that
the award of a government contract is not a wholly discretionary action
but rather one which the court will review to determine if the government
has met the standards of commercial good faith and fair dealing. 42
Gonzales v. Freeman's and Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Campbell" involved the issue of standing to challenge the government's
practice of "blacklisting" or debarring certain contractors from doing
business with the government. After a careful review of the conse-
quences of such action, both courts concluded that the APA permits,
and Perkins does not preclude, the plaintiff's standing to challenge the
Comptroller General's actions." In Copper Plumbing & Heating, the
court recognized that while the plaintiffs did not have a right to con-
tract with the government, they did have "a right not to be invalidly
denied equal opportunity" to seek government contracts." If they are
deprived of this right, they suffer a "legal wrong" within the meaning
of the APA.47 In Gonzalez, the court extended the procedural safe-
guards of notice and hearing to the debarment action. Moreover, on
the issue of standing, the court stated:
[T]o say that there is no "right" to government contracts
does not resolve the question of justiciability. Of course there
is no such right; but that cannot mean that the government
42 In support of its holding the court cited dictum in United States v. Purcell En-
velope Co., 249 U.S. 313 (1919) to the effect that unlimited discretion on the part of
government contracting officers does not allow them to disregard mandatory procurement
procedures. In Purcell, the Court found that the plaintiff's bid had been accepted and,
therefore, had resulted in a contract upon which the company could sue. However, the
court stated that Revised Statute 3709 "is a provision . . . in the interest of both govern-
ment and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations on both." Id.
at 318.
42 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
44 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
45 The Comptroller General's authority to debar firms who have not paid their
laborers or mechanics is set forth in the Davis-Bacon Act, March 3, 1931, ch. 411; as
amended, 49 Stat. 1011, 46 U.S,C. 276a-276a-5 (1964). The Comptroller derives his
authority to determine the legality of contracts awarded by government agencies from
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 31 U.S.C. HI 71, 74 (1964) under which he is
obligated to disallow credit in the accounts of fiscal officers of the government for dis-
bursements not made in accordance with federal law. See, e.g., 46 Comp. Gen. 441, 453
(1966). Pursuant to this authority, the Comptroller assumes jurisdiction over questions
of contract formation, the rules upon which invitations for bids must be cancelled, the
rejection of bids and the cancellation of contracts. His decisions on these matters are
issued both in published bound volumes and in manuscript form. The latter, cited here
as Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs., arc often referred to as "unpublished" decisions. They are
available upon request to the Comptroller's office, the United States General Accounting
Office in Washington, D.C. For a recent and critical analysis of the Comptroller's posi-
tion, see Cibinec and Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 349 (1970).
45 290 F.2d at 371.
47 See text at note 25 supra.
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can act arbitrarily,-
 either substantively. or 'procedurally,
againgt a person or that such person is not •entitled 'to' chal-
lenge' the processes and the evidence before he is officially .,
declared ineligible for government contracts..• An allegation
of facts Which reveal an absence of legal. authority, or basic
• fairness in the MethOd of imposing debarment presents a
justiciable controversy. . 	 The injury to appellants . .
gives them standing to challenge the debarment processes..: 48
, •
Both decisions distinguished the Perkins holding op. the •.basis that
the debai.ment action involved .specific manufacturers rather than the
entire industry as in Perkini,,,and that- sUch.action terminated an ex-
isting and ,econornically crucial relationship ,beivieen the, government
and a conti.aCtor, rather Alan merely affecting the position of one
initially, seeking a particular contract.
• The final decision prior , to Scanwell representing a departure
from the Perkins , rationale is Superior, Oil Co. v. 'Uclall, 4P written in
1969 by the then Circuit Judge Warren. Burger. In this action, both
the . plaintiff and Union Oil submitted bids to, the Department. of the
Interior for an oil lease. Although the Union Oil bid offered the best
price, it was initially - rejected by the Contracting 'officer on the grounds
that the bid' form' vas not- signed by an officer of. the corporation as
required by ,both the Notice of Sale' and 'applicable regulations. Sub-
sequently, the Secretary of the Interior,. Mr. Udall, reversed the de-
cision of his 'subordinate and attempted to, award the lease to Union.
,On application•by Superibr, the lower court enjoined the SeCretarY
from taking such action.50, The decision was affirmed by the' court of
appeals which held, inter alia, that the Secretary did not have the dish
cretion to waive the decision of " the contracting officer • to reject the
unresponsive bid of Union." The court reasoned that the regulations
at issue gave the contracting .officer authority to reject hids,, and did
not-give the SeCretary authority to overrule that officer's decision. In
reaching its decision, the court did not indicate whether it agreed with
the'slistrict cronit's'finding that Superines bid had been accepted by the
contracting officer; whether. such evidence was , prima facie evidence of a
contract upon which Superior could sue for breach, or whether Superior
had- standing upon _some other basis.. Whatever the basis, the court . 'did
not state, that Superior had. standing to•sue because it was an unsuccess-
ful' bidden52	 Ir	 •	 Iit	 •	 :o
4S 334 F.2d at 574-75.
• 49 409 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The case was later dismissed sub nom. Superior Oil
Co. v. nickel, 421' F.2d' 1089 (1969) when the parties•agreed to Settle • the dispute. • •
50 133 U.S. App. D.C. 198 (1969).
61 409 F.2d at 119.	 •
52 The Scanwell court cited Superior Oil as implledly•1161dIng that unsuccessful bid-
10
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All of the decisions discussed, above found that a legal right ex-
isted in the "aggrieved" plaintiff to, sue 'in order to protect his, own
economic interests. In Friend, .the court .prohibited the government
from interfering with the .plaintiff's business,. but did ,not require the
government to defend the validity .of a contract award. The contract
involved in Heyer had already been. performed and interference with
the government's procurement operations was never a . disputed issue.
Although the court dismissed the, claim, for 'lost profits, it did hold that
the plaintiff had standing to sue for recovery of. its bid preparation ex-
penses. Neither 4 Gonzales ,nor ICopper-Plumbing &._ Heating involved
challenges to - the validity of a specific contract; rather, they granted
to the plaintiffs a light to procedural ,due, process during debarment
proceedings. Finally, Superior , Oil appears merely to have upheld the
validity of a contract which. the lower court-found had already been
executed by an authorized government agent. None 'of these decisions
expressly held that unsuccessful bidders have standing to sue, either
on their own behalf or on behalf 'Of :the. public; for cancellatidn of a
government contract not awarded tinder rprocedures conforming to
those prescribed by the prOcurement statutes or'regulations. This latter
step remained for Scaniell.
III. THE Scanwell DECISION
.	 The controversy involved in Scanwell resulted from the issuance
by the FedereAviation'Administration• (FAA)' of an invitation forbids
,for certain instrument landing systems. These systems were.td,be in-
stalled in airports throughout the country.and were designed to make
the approach of aircraft safer. In soliciting the bids, the FAA specifi-
cally provided in the invitation for bids that only those manufacturers
who already had such systems installed and tested in at least one loca-
tion would be eligible for the 'award." The,cOntract was awarded to the
,	 .
ders have standing to sue in the , event a government contract is illegally awarded, 424
F.2d 859, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1970). However, the •only discussion of standing was' in the
district court which merely stated that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of the action, citing for support both the APA and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 ,et seq. (1964),. , 1, • •
The award of the contract involved• in Superior Oil was governed .by the Outer.Con-
tinental, Shelf Lands Act, and 'the. regulations issued purstiant thereto, not by the more
common procurement statutes enacted in ,1947. and 1949. Unlike these latter procurement
statutes, 43 U.S.C. 1 1333(b) provides: "The United States district courts shall, have
original jurisdictiom of cases and controversies • [concerning the Outer Continental
Shelf). . . ."
as The invitation for bids provided: 	 •
To be responsive to this request, the contractor shall submit evidence that an
identical equipment complement as that proposed for this procurement has pre-
viously been installed in at least one location and has achieved at least Category
1 performance as certified by an FAA flight check.
424 F.2d at 860, n.l.
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lowest bidder, Cutler-Hammer, Inc. Scanwell, the second lowest bidder,
brought suit against the FAA challenging the award on the grounds
that Cutler-Hammer's bid was not responsive to the invitation because
its product had never been installed and tested as an integrated sys-
tem, but only as separate components." The district court dismissed
the suit holding that Scanwell lacked standing to challenge the govern-
ment's actions."
On appeal, the government relied heavily on Perkins to support
its position. However, the court found this reliance "ill-founded.""
The 1952 Fuibright Amendment" to the Walsh-Healey Act" demon-
strates, the court observed, "that the basic approach of the Supreme
Court in the Perkins case has been legislatively reversed. . . ."" More-
over, the court noted that the enactment of the APA has greatly mod-
ified the law of standing and evidences a legislative purpose favoring
judicial review of administrative actions. It stated that:
in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet chosen
to hold that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to all
situations in which a party who is in fact aggrieved seeks re-
view, regardless of a lack of legal right or specific statutory
language, it is clearly the intent of that Act that this should
be the case.8°
Finally, the court observed that recent decisions have established that
a party injured in fact, but without a historically recognized legal right,
nevertheless has standing to sue as a "private attorney general," that is,
as a surrogate for the public interest which the relevant statute was
enacted to protect.
54
 424 F.2d at 860.
55
 Prior to filing suit in the district court, a formal protest was filed on Scanwell's
behalf with the COmptroller General alleging the same facts as were later presented to the
district court. In response to the protest, the FAA argued that the requirement for in-
stallation and testing was not a technical minimum need which all bidders had to agree to
meet, but rather was one of several elements designed to prove the responsibility or
capability of the bidder to manufacture the product. The distinction is significant because
the Comptroller General takes the position that bids failing to meet the literal require-
ments of responsibility stated in the invitation need not be rejected if the bidder can
prove that he is capable of manufacturing the required item. See, e.g., 45 Comp. Gen. 4
(1965). The Comptroller General, in Scanwell, upheld the FAA's interpretation of the
invitation requirement for installation and testing and, with some apparent misgivings,
rejected the protest. Comp. Gen. Ms. Dees. B-166468 (1969). To appreciate Scanwell's
growing desire for judicial review, see Comp. Gen. Ms. Dees. B-163024 (1968), in which
Scanwell unsuccessfully contested an earlier FAA procurement of similar equipment by
negotiation rather than formal advertising.
55 424 F.2d at 867.
57 41 U.S.C. I 43(a) (1964).
58
 41 U.S.C.1§ 35-45 (1964).
58 424 F.2d at 867.
55 Id. at 872.	 -
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The court agreed with the "private attorney general" theory and
found that "the essential thrust of appellant's claim on the merits is to
satisfy the public interest in having agencies follow the regulations
which control government contracting." 61 The court quoted with ap-
proval from National Assn of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC" the
thought that the basic justification for permitting standing to sue is
"to vindicate a public interest, and not a private right."" Thus, while
"there is no right in Scanwell to have the contract awarded to it in the
event the district court finds illegality in the award .. . to Cutler-
Hammer,"" nevertheless,•Scanwell can further both its private interest
and that of the public by seeking to cancel a contract allegedly
awarded by illegal means.
The Scanwell court recognized that the Supreme Court, in Per-
kins, specifically ruled that an unsuccessful bidder has no standing in
court either to recoup private losses or to represent the public interest
in seeing that contracts are awarded in accordance with applicable
procurement statutes and regulations. Despite the fact that the Su-
preme Court has not ruled on the issue, the court in Scanwell found
that the enactment of the APA and the "recent trend" of Supreme
Court decisions on standing in controversies not involving government
contracts indicate that Perkins is no longer viable law." For these
reasons, the court held that Scanwell had standing to sue under Section
10 of the APA, and accordingly remanded the case to the district court
for a trial on the merits."
Initially, the Scanwell decision deserves two critical comments."
First, the court undoubtedly has over-emphasized the significance of
the Fulbright Amendment. That amendment only indicates that Con-
gress intended to reverse the narrow holding of Perkins that wage
determinations by the Secretary of Labor cannot be contested in
court." If Congress had intended to reverse the basic approach of
Perkins and grant standing to unsuccessful bidders, it would have
amended Revised Statute 3709 or the more recent procurement statutes
01 Id. at 864.
02 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
03 424 F.2d at 870.
64 Id. at 864.
66 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ; Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390
U.S. 1 (1968) ; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
66 The court also ruled against the government's argument of sovereign immunity
reasoning that the APA, when applicable, waives that defense. 424 F.2d at 873-74. The
government also argued, unsuccessfully, that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administra-
tive remedies, and that the award action was not reviewable because it was committed
to agency discretion. Id. at 875.
61 Some may think the decision deserves more, particularly the point that when
Congress passed the APA, the abuse of authority it intended to preclude did not embrace
government action in its so-called "proprietary" roles of buying goods and services.
00 See Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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enacted in 1947 and 1949 which supplement and, in large measure,
supersede Revised Statute 3709. Significantly, it is these later statutes
and their implementing regulations which bidders most commonly claim
have been violated in the award of government contracts, and under
which most bidders seek to have such awards invalidated by a court
or by the Comptroller General of the United States. This comment,
however, does not go to the foundation of the decision, and, therefore,
does not suggest that Scanwell is in error. .
The fundamental thrust of the court's discussion of Perkins is not
that Congress intended to modify or overrule that decision when it
enacted the APA or the Fulbright Amendment. Rather the court simply
concluded that, in the absence of an express legislative intent to the
contrary, government contract awards should be subject to judicial
review. At first glance, it appears that the court largely based its con-
clusion on several recent Supreme Court decisions" which indicate that
the Court is now more willing to confer standing than in 1940 when
Perkins was decided. However, it must be noted that none of these
decisions involved government contract awards. Thus, the court found
it necessary to devise some rationale for not following the Perkins rule
which it believed no longer represents the view of the Supreme Court.
The second critical comment concerns the rationale devised by the
court to avoid the Perkins rule. The court theorized that its grant of
standing to an unsuccessful bidder was justified because of the bidder's
status as a "private attorney general" suing on behalf of the public.
While the phrase does have an attractive jurisprudential ring, it is
nevertheless an obvious fiction which only those who stand to gain
economically from its acceptance can embrace as a reflection of reality.
Moreover, it adds nothing of substance to the decision. The court ob-
served that a plaintiff whether he be a private attorney general or not,
must show before he is granted standing that the agency has injured
him in a serious manner." Thus, one who is interested in "goOd govern-
ment," but who has no personal stake in a particular• procurement,
would not have standing under Scanwell to contest the validity of that
procurement. The court itself recognized that the plaintiff seeking re-
dress for economic injury may be less interested in the general public
welfare than in securing the benefits he would have enjoyed if the
relevant procurement statutes and regulations had been followed.P
Indeed, it is his own economic interest, not his interest in the general
welfare, which gives the court confidence that the constitutional re-
quirement of a "case or controversy" will be satisfied."
69 See supra note 65.
To 424 F.2d at 872.
71 Id. at 866-67.
72 Id. at 864-65.
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In point of fact, the bidder does not bring suit on behalf of anyone
other than himself. This does not suggest, however, that such a suit
would be of no benefit to the public. In conferring standing in two re-
cent cases," for example, the Supreme Court found that the regulation
of industries for the public welfare would best be assured by permitting
those members of the public most concerned with the industry to sue
not on behalf of, but certainly in the interests of, the general. public.
One element of the public interest likely to be present in any suit
against administrative action, whether brought on behalf of the public
or not, is the effort to seek enforcement of such regulation as Congress
may have intended the public to enjoy. In any given case, however,
the public may have countervailing interests. The distinction between
suing "on behalf of the public" and suing "in the interests of the pub-
lic" lies in the difference between a fiction that private parties may
choose to assume the mantle of the attorney general, and an inquiry,
balancing benefit against detriment, into what is considered to be in the
overall interests of the public. Both may come to the same end, but
the former circumvents the inquiry.
The characterization of one who seeks standing as a "private
attorney general" portrays the plaintiff as a crusader for the public
and avoids any discussion of the unfavorable consequences of granting
standing to sue in the area of government contract awards. To allow
unsuccessful bidders standing to challenge government contracts on the
basis of their unconscious altruism may prove unsound for it is far
from clear that the cancellation of government contracts, and the delay
and cost incident thereto, vindicate a public interest. The decision on
'standing, given the absence of congressional intent, must ultimately
rest upon the court's judgment, and justification, of what is in the
public interest. Thus, the essential question may be framed as follows:
is the public interest in having its 50 billion procurement dollars both
committed by fair and established rules, and at the same time spent
in the most economical and efficient manner, best served by permitting
unsuccessful bidders to contest the legality of government contract
awards? The Perkins decision answered the question in the negative,
and supported its answer by emphasizing the benefit to the public . in
having its procurement dollars spent economically and efficiently. On
the other hand, Scanwell responded in the affirmative, and supported
its position by emphasizing the benefit to the public in having its
government award contracts in accordance with published and estab-
lished regulations.
78 Hardin v, Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) ; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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IV. THE STANDING ISSUE: ITS LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS IN
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT SUITS
The adumbrations on standing which the court in Scanwell sensed
from the recent "trend of cases . . . in the Supreme Court" 74 have
taken on more substance since the Scanwell decision was rendered.
Since that decision, the Supreme Court, in both its majority and con-
curring opinions, has clearly abandoned the traditional prerequisites
to standing of either a "legal right" or of language or intent in the
statute allegedly violated which specifically grants standing to certain
designated parties."
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp," an association of data processing companies sued to reverse
a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency that the Bank Service
Corporation Act of 1962" does not prohibit national banks from selling
data processing services to other banks. The Court observed that
" [w]here statutes are concerned the trend is toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action."" The Court
reasoned that since the Bank Service Corporation Act" "arguably
brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it,""
and does not explicitly deny standing, the association, which has been
injured in fact and therefore is an "aggrieved party," has standing to
sue under the APA to protect its own private economic interests. While
the Court remarked that one who is likely to be financially injured may
be a reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public
interest,8 ' the Court's opinion clearly indicates that such a status was
not necessary to establish standing.
In discussing the traditional "legal interest" test, the Court stated
that such a test goes to the merits and is not a prerequisite to stand-
ing.82 Thus, only after a full trial can it be determined whether anything
in the Bank Service Corporation Act, 83 or the • National Bank Act,"
gives the association a " 'legal interest' that protects them against
violations of those Acts, and whether the actions of respondents did
74 424 F.2d at 868.
75 See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970) ; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). For a discussion of these cases, see
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
78 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
77 12 U.S.C. U 1861-65 (1964).
78 397 U.S. at 154.
To 12 U.S.C. II 1861-65 (1964).
55 397 U.S. at 156.
al Id. at 154.
88 Id. at 158.,
83 12 U.S.C. H 1861-65 (1964).
84 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1964).
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in fact violate either of those acts. 786 Accordingly, the case was re-
manded to the district court for a trial on the merits.
Less than two months after the Supreme Court's decision in Data
Processing, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Lodge
1858, American Federation of Government Employees v. Paine, 8° again
held that certain plaintiffs had standing to challenge the validity of a
government contract. In rendering its opinion, however, the court was
less willing than either the court in Scanwell or Data Processing to em-
brace the novel principle that if the interests of the plaintiffs are only
"arguably" within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute
allegedly violated, standing may be grounded on the APA.
In Lodge 1858, the court granted certain civil servants and their
union standing to contest the legality of a government contract under
the terms of which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) had obtained base support services. The plaintiffs contended
that the enabling legislation of NASA, which provides for the appoint-
ment of employees "in accordance with civil-service laws,"" required
that the support services be performed by civil servants. The court's
rationale for granting standing was that the scheme of the NASA Act
evidences a legislative purpose to protect the competitive interests of
civil servants." Thus, standing was granted solely because the court
determined that the plaintiffs were "arguably" within the class intended
to be protected by the allegedly violated statute. The APA and the
Data Processing decision merely reinforced the court's holding insofar
as it rejected the "legal right" test of standing.
The distinction between Lodge 1858 and Scanwell significantly
affects their precedential value vis-à-vis government contract cases.
The former concerns an alleged conflict between a contract for services
and the employment laws of a civilian agency, rather than the general
procurement statutes. In addition, the holding in Lodge 1858 is based
upon an affirmative finding that the legislative scheme of those em-
ployment statutes evidences a congressional intent to confer standing
in order to contest economic injury of the type presented in the case.
However, the Scanwell decision, like the Data Processing decision, is
based on the mere absence of a contrary legislative intent, notwith-
standing the court's conjecture that the legislative intent in the area of
government contracting generally seemed to run in favor of judicial
review. Thus, the Lodge 1858 decision is unlikely to influence future
eis 397 U.S. at 158. The companion case to Data Processing, Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970) held that Congress intended that tenant farmers, eligible for payments
under the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444 (Supp. IV, 1964), have
standing to sue under that Act.
80 No. 22,006 (D.C. Cir. April 21, 1970).
wr 42 U.S.C. g 2473 (b) (2) (1964).
88 No. 22,006 (D.C. Cir. April 21, 1970) at 18.
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cases in which the plaintiff seeks standing to challenge the validity of
actions taken pursuant to the general procurement statutes, which
indicate no congressional intent to allow standing.
The next major decision following Scanwell in the area of standing
to challenge government contracts is Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig."
This action involved the Wagner-O'Day Act, 9° under which the Ad-
ministrator of the General Services Administration determined that
contract competition for the supply of government pens should be
limited to firms employing the blind. The plaintiff did not employ the
blind and, consequently, was precluded from submitting a bid. The
court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal and held that
since the Wagner-O'Day Act" did not preclude judicial review, the
plaintiff had standing as a private attorney general to contest the Ad-
ministrator's determination under the APA.92
 Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the district court for a trial on the merits. Since Ballerina
deals with the specialized Wagner-O'Day Act" rather than the general
procurement statutes, the scope of its precedential value is limited with
respect to government, contract cases, although not to the same extent
as the Lodge 1858 decision. Its limitations are not as restrictive for two
reasons.
The first reason concerns the status of the plaintiff. In Scanwell,
the plaintiff was an unsuccessful bidder claiming that the government
improperly entertained its competitor's offer. In Lodge 1858, the plain-
tiffs were civil servants and their union alleging that the government
had no authority to award any contract for the services in dispute. In
Ballerina, however, the plaintiff neither bid for a contract nor claimed
that the government was without authority to make an award. Ballerina
claimed that it was legally injured because it was among those fore-
closed from having an opportunity to bid, and contended that the
foreclosure resulted from an improper interpretation of a statute de-
signed to achieve certain economic and social goals.
Under the rationale of Ballerina standing may be afforded to those
who claim that they were not allowed to offer a bid because the pro-
curing agency misinterpreted certain socio-economic statutes or regula-
tions in a manner which illegally restricted competition. For example,
may a large business attempt to stop a government agency' from setting
aside certain contracts for small business under the Small Business
_Act?" May contractors obtain an injunction against the incorporation
89 No. 22,799 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1970).
99 41 U.S.C. I 46-48 (1964).
lig Id.
92 No. 22,799 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1970). Petition for cert. filed; August 14, 1970.
98 41 U.S.C. § 46-48 (1964).
94 15 U.S.C. 631 et seq. (1964). •
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into a contract of an allegedly arbitrary wage determination by the
Secretary of Labor under the Service Contract Act of 1965?" Similarly,
can contractors prevent an agency from giving certain competitive
preferences to a firm in a labor surplus area, as authorized by Sec-
tion 1-803 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations and Section
1-1.802-2 of the Federal Procurement Regulations ?°° Finally, apart
from such socio-economic statutes, will standing be afforded to one
who claims that the general procurement statutes have been violated
because the specifications in a solicitation are so restrictive, or the time
allowed for submitting a bid is so limited, that he has no genuine op-
portunity to offer a bid? These questions suggest that prospective bid-
ders will have to await further decisions in order to determine whether
the APA provides standing to sue for violations of any statutes which
are ancillary to the procurement statutes; and whether standing may
be established where the plaintiff's injury is, in fact, somewhat specula-
tive because, not having been allowed to bid on the contract, he cannot
claim to have been eligible for the contract award.
The second aspect of the Ballerina decision which contributes
to its value as precedent concerns its interpretation of Data Processing
and Barlow v. Collins," the recent Supreme Court decisions which held
that a "legal interest" is not a prerequisite to standing. According to
Ballerina, these decisions establish:
that a party has standing to challenge the government's award
of a contract, even in the absence of specific "person ag-
grieved" language in the statute under which the contract is
let, if a three-part test is satisfied. First, the party must allege
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact .. .
The plaintiff must further allege that the agency has acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of its statutory authority
so as to injure an interest that is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question. Finally, there must be no
"clear and convincing" indication of a legislative intent to
withhold judicial review. (Emphasis added.)'
However, Data Processing stated that where there is injury in fact
to the plaintiff, the only remaining question for standing is "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
95 41 U.S.C.	 351-57 (Supp. TV, 1969).
9° Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), 32 C.F.R. pts. 1-39; Federal
Procurement Regulations (FPR), 41 C.F.R. 1-1.00 et seq.; National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Procurement Regulations (NASAPR), 41 C.F.R. ch. 18-1-52.
97 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
98 No. 22,799 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1970) at 7.
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stitutional guarantee in question." 90 Thus, it appears that the court in
Ballerina has, without explanation, identified "the interest sought to be
protected by the complaintant" with the plaintiff's allegation that the
agency acted arbitrarily or in excess of its statutory authority. This
point becomes clearer by reviewing the concurring opinion of Justices
Brennan and White in Data Processing. They concluded that the only
test of standing should be whether the plaintiff alleges that the chal-
lenged action has caused him such actual harm as to assure the
existence of a genuine controversy. The second test, the "zone of in-
terests" test, was considered confusing and unnecessary. Justice Bren-
nan asked:
How specific an "interest" must he (the plaintiff) advance?
Will a broad, general claim, such as competitive interest, suf-
fice, or must he identify a specific legally protected interest
. . And what is the distinction between a "protected" and a
"regulated" interest? Is it possible that a plaintiff may chal-
lenge agency action under a statute that unquestionably reg-
ulates the interest at stake, but that expressly excludes the
plaintiff's class from among the statutory beneficiaries?"°
In government procurement, the crucial question is whether a
plaintiff, having an "interest" in competition, may challenge agency
action under a statute which unquestionably regulates the interest at
stake, but under which the plaintiff's class is neither expressly excluded
from, nor expressly included among the statutory beneficiaries. Bal-
lerina answers the question by suggesting that if the "statutory scheme"
or primary purpose of the procurement legislation would be thwarted
by the arbitrary actions of government officials, the court should con-
clude that those parties, who are injured by such actions, have interests
which are parallel to those of Congress. Thus, the interests of those
parties may be considered within the "zone of interests" to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute, even though Congress did not enact
the legislation to protect the economic interests of those injured parties.
The interest sought to be protected by Ballerina, which interest
will not afford standing unless it is within the "zone of interests" pro-
tected by the procurement statute, is the plaintiff's interest in pre-
venting government agents from arbitrarily subverting the statutory
scheme. The court viewing the problem in this fashion, reasoned that
Ballerina's specific economic injury need not be within the ambit of the
relevant statute's protection. Rather, the court observed:
Appellants (Ballerina) concede that the Wagner-O'Day Act
99 397 U.S. at 133.
100 397 U.S. at 177.
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does not confer specific rights on them and that it was not en-
acted for their benefit . .. They do submit, however, that the
legislative history of that Act clearly shows a concern for and
desire to protect private industries which might be disadvan-
taged by the inclusion of certain products on the schedule (of
products made by the blind). 101
The legislative history of the Act, however, was confined to the
floor debates, the committee reports being silent on the problems of
competition with private industry. Furthermore, the court's grant of
standing to Ballerina was based on Ballerina's prima facie showing
of unauthorized acts by the government agency, thereby establishing
an "interest" in limiting the agency's acts to those authorized by Con-
gress. Clearly, the grant of standing was not based on a finding that one
purpose of the Wagner-O'Day Act 102 was to protect the economic in-
terests of private industries.'"
The ease with which the "zone of interests" test of standing can
be met is evident from another recent federal court decision, Black-
hawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver.'" In this action, the Veterans
Administration, pursuant to its own procurement regulations and the
Federal Procurement Regulations which implement the Federal Prop-
erty and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 1" found that the low
bidder, Blackhawk, lacked the responsibility necessary to be awarded
a hospital construction contract. The lower court dismissed the suit
on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the govern-
ment agency's determination. On appeal, the court substantially re-
peated the three criteria it had enunciated in Ballerina and, without
any further discussion, concluded that the "application of these cri-
teria to the present case compels the conclusion that appellant has
standing to challenge the instant agency action."'°° The court noted
that the plaintiffs in Scanwell and Ballerina were private attorneys
general and indicated that Blackhawk fulfilled the same role. It offered
no discussion of whether Congress intended to confer or withhold
standing under the 1949 procurement statute, or of why whatever in-
terest Blackhawk was seeking to protect was within the critical "zone
of interests" protected by the procurement statute.
Blackhawk does more than share with Ballerina a facility to read
1°1 No. 22,799 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1970) at 16.
102 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1964).
103
 Nevertheless, it is the plaintiff's economic injury which assures the existence of
a controversy. No. 22,799 at 10.
	 -
104 No. 22,956 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1970). See also, Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, No. 23,813 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 1970) at 6, n.16.
106 41 U.S.C. fifi 251-60 (1964).
106 No. 22,956 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1970) at 4.
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an unsuccessful bidder's interest into the "zone of interests" sought
to be protected by the procurement statutes. It also demonstrates that
the question on the merits of whether the procurement statute gives
the plaintiff a specific "legal interest" may be conveniently bypassed.
The court in Blackhawk found that the district court's treatment of
the issues had virtually eliminated any genuine issues of material fact
and considered itself free to proceed to the merits of the case. The
"merits," however, involved only the question of whether the agency
had properly found that the plaintiff was not a responsible contractor.
The court did not first consider whether, in the language of the Data
Processing decision, "anything in the [statute allegedly violated] gives
petitioners a 'legal interest' that protects them against violations of
those Acts." 107
 Rather, once having decided that Blackhawk had an
arguable "interest" within the "zone of interests" protected by the
procurement statutes which the agency allegedly violated, the court
bypassed the important substantive issue of whether Blackhawk also
had a specific "legal interest" which was protected by those same
statutes. 108
The court's apparent reluctance to discuss and distinguish the
"zone of interests" protected by the relevant statute, and the specific
"legal interest" possibly granted by the statute, is not difficult to un-
derstand. Data Processing did not define the terms. The Court's only
explanation of "legal rights" was a quotation from Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. TTlelm in which it defined the term as "one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or
one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."'" Unfortunately,
the Court made little attempt to illuminate the manner by which one
determines whether a statute confers a privilege. Mr. Justices Brennan
and White, in a concurring opinion, stated that they were confused by
the term "zone of interests."
The concurring opinion in Data Processing discarded the "zone
of interests" test and attempted to enunciate a practical distinction
between standing, reviewability, and the merits, with the merits in-
107 397 U.S. at 158.
1" After the Data Processing decision, the Justice Department petitioned the court
of appeals for a rehearsing of the Scanwell decision. In its petition, it did not argue that
Scanwell's interest was outside the "zone of interests" protected by the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949. However, since the Data Processing case said
that a plaintiff's recovery depended on its proving during a trial on the merits before the
lower court that it had a 'legal interest" protected by statute, and since there were no
disputed facts to be resolved in the Scanwell case, the Justice Department asked the
Scanwell court to decide if Scanwell had a "legal interest," or at least to amend its re-
mand order to instruct the district court to decide that issue. The petition was denied,
without discussion. Judge MacKinnon dissented.
100 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
110 Id. at 137-38.
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eluding a resolution of the question of whether the specific legal interest
claimed by the plaintiff is protected by the relevant statute. Ac-
cording to the concurring opinion, a plaintiff's acquisition of standing
to sue requires only an allegation of injury in fact. However, the fact
that the plaintiff has standing does not mean that the issue is judicially
reviewable." To make this latter determination requires a "canvass
of relevant statutory materials . . • to determine . . . whether Con-
gress meant to deny or to allow judicial review of agency action at the
instance of the plaintiff."' In the absence of express language con-
ferring standing, slight statutory indicia may suffice to show that the
plaintiff has established his right to review and thus to reach the merits
of the case.' As to the merits, the Court stated:
The same statutory indicia, that afford the plaintiff a right to
review also bear on the merits beCause they provide evidence
that the statute protects his class, and thus that he is entitled
to relief if he can show that the challenged agency action vi-
olated the statute. Evidence that the plaintiff's class is a stat-
utory beneficiary, however, need not be as strong for the
purpose of obtaining review as for the purpose of establish-
ing the plaintiff's claim on the merits.'"
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan has the virtue of
categorizing the elements of the problem with almost hornbook sim-
plicity. However, it does not delineate the relative strengths of the
evidence required to establish "reviewability" and to establish the
"merits" insofar as that term refers to proof of a legal interest pro-
tected by the statute. How many courts may one realistically expect to
hold that slight statutory indicia show that Congress intended the
plaintiff's class to have the benefit of judicial review, but that the in-
dicia are not strong enough -to provide proof of a "specific legal inter-
est," thus ending the court's review without ever considering the ques-
tion . of whether the agency action did, in fact, violate the relevant
statute?
The decisions of the courts of appeals indicate that the issues
of reviewability and standing will be merged with the merits issue of
whether the plaintiff has a legal right or interest protected' by the pro-
curement statutes. Once convinced that the plaintiff has been genuinely
injured if his allegations are true, the courts will proceed quickly to in-
quire whether the statute or implementing regulations have been
violated by agency action. If the court decides that the statute or regula-
111 397 U.S. at 1734.
112
 397 U.S. at 169.
118 397 U.S. at 175-6.
114
 Id. (concurring opinion).
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tions have been violated, its decision will first conclude that the plaintiff's
interest is legally protected by a relevant statute, thus providing stand-
ing; " 6
 or, utilizing the language and reasoning of the Data Processing
decision, the court may conclude that the plaintiff's interest is within the
"zone of interests" protected by the statute and, therefore, that standing
is granted by the APA. If the court concludes, however, that the relevant
statutes or regulations have not been violated, it may, as in Blackhawk,
simply say so, or it may opine that the plaintiff's interest is not within
the protected "zone of interests." In this area, conflicts between the
circuits may be anticipated; some holding that the plaintiff loses be-
cause he has no standing, others holding that he loses because the stat-
utes or regulations have not been violated. In any event, whether one
accepts the above prognostications or not, the decisions of the courts
of appeals on standing to challenge the award of government contracts
are sufficient by themselves to warrant exploring the effect of similar
future suits on private contractors and the government procurement
process. 116
V. THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONTRACT
CANCELLATION ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND THE
PROCUREMENT PROCESS
One result of the Scanwell court's decision is apparent. An un-
successful bidder who is willing and able to endure the expense and
vexation of a law suit now has the option of seeking to have a court
deny his competitor the enjoyment of the profits anticipated from that
contract. However, the government contractor who, in good faith, has
been awarded the contract is the one most seriously affected by the
standing of his competitor.
From the successful bidder's point of view, the contract award
115
 See Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, No. 428-33 (2d Cir. April
16, 1970) at 2347, 2349.
116
 Presumably, most actions in the near future will be brought in the District
Court for the District of Columbia for three reasons: (1) plaintiffs know that at least
this district court must follow the Scanwell line of decisions; (2) plaintiffs may wish to
retain one of the many attorneys in the District of Columbia who are experienced in
government contract suits; and (3) plaintiffs may wish to begin a separate suit for bid
preparation costs in the Court of Claims, which is located only in Washington. However,
since the United States, the defendant in all of these cases, "resides" in each of the fifty
states, plaintiffs may be able to commence actions in their local district courts. If the
Scanwell decision gains wider acceptance, plaintiffs' preference for local courts may de-
velop, thus shifting the responsibility of defending the United States to the local U.S.
Attorney. The local attorney will have less expertise in the field, and will have less time
to confer with the responsible government agents in Washington. It is not too unchari-
table to suspect that a trend toward the use of local courts also may be enhanced because
those courts are less familiar with the idiosyncrasies of government contract law, such as
the rule that an agent of the government with apparent but not actual authority cannot
bind his principle to what proves to be a bad bargain for the government. See e.g., Fed-
eral Crop Ins. Corp. v. United States, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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created a firm obligation which bound him to begin performance or
risk cancellation of the contract for default. If standing is afforded
unsuccessful bidders and the court finds that the contract award is
illegal, it may "set aside agency action'"" by cancelling the contract,
or "compel agency action unlawfully withheld""s by directing the
agency to award the contract to the competitor who would have re-
ceived it had proper procurement procedures been followed."° The
remedy of contract cancellation, the only remedy considered by Scan-
well and compatible with the language of the APA, is patently in-
equitable to the successful bidder. It may prove particularly onerous
in a fixed price contract, or one where the reimbursement of his costs,
not to mention profits, depends upon his completing a contract which
he may not be allowed to complete; and even more so where such con-
tracts are for complex items which have no market other than the
government agency which procured them.
In addition to the individual contractor, the government procure-
ment process, by which the government obtains the goods and services
necessary to execute the programs authorized by Congress, is also
adversely affected by the grant of standing to unsuccessful bidders.
Despite this fact, the court in Scanwell and Ballerina expressed only
one concern, before dismissing it, over the possibility that the grant of
standing to unsuccessful bidders would adversely affect the procure-
ment process. The court dismissed the idea of opening a "Pandora's
box" of litigation as bankrupt of substance, in view of the judicial
discretion the court may exercise to avoid frivolous suits, the experience
of state courts when they relaxed the criteria for standing to sue, and
the expense and vexation of bringing law suits.' 2° Apparently, however,
that one concern had grown by the time the court rendered its decision
in Blackhawk. There the court explained the Scanwell and Ballerina
decisions as having noted that "the mere fact that a party has standing
to sue does not entitle him to render uncertain for a prolonged period
of time government contracts which are vital to the functions per-
formed by the sovereign."121
The solution reached by the court in Blackhawk to avoid these
"prolonged delays" was the suggested use of summary proceedings.
117
	 § 706(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
118 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
no That a court might direct the actual award of a contract by an executive agency
thus appears to be a distinct possibility notwithstanding (1) dictum in Scanwell to the
contrary, 424 F.2d at 864, (2) the authority of the government to reject all offers and
resolicit bids, and (3) the important constitutional questions which such action would
raise with respect to the separation of powers. See also Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, C.A.
No. 1760-70 (D.C. September 24, 1970); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, C.A. No. 2713-
70 (D.C. D.C. September 9, 1970).
120 424 F.2d at 872-73,
121 No. 22, 956 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1970 at 5.
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The trial judge had correctly determined that Blackhawkii allegations
presented no genuine issues of material fact, and that, as a matter of
law, the contracting officer had done all which was required to deter-
mine that Blackhawk was not a responsible bidder. Had the trial judge
foreseen that the prevailing.criterii of standing were to be relaxed, he
could have properly issued summary judgment against. Blackhawk.' 22
The court in Blackhawk does not suggest however; how it might
expeditiously deal with cases involving a material issue of fact or sev-
eral complicated questions of law. These cases are not difficult to im-
agine and may also challenge "government contracts which are vital
to the functions performed by the sovereign.'" 28
 Delays will first be
encountered by motions for temporary restraining orders and injunc-
tions. Then, if an injunction is issued, the government may be forced
to wait several months or longer before reaching a trial on the merits.
Because of the serious consequences of such a delay, the government
may decide to cancel the incumbent's contract on the basis of the in-
junction, and either award •a new contract to the plaintiff or re-solicit
offers. Whatever course the government decides to follow, further de-
lay is almost a certainty since the firm whose contract has been can-
celled, either after the injunction issues or after a trial on the merits,
will almost certainly appeal the court's decision. A successful appeal
will return the government to the dilemma it faced with the lower court
decision. The government may, of course, return to the original con-
tractor, and hope that the new losing party does not successfully peti-
tion the Supreme Court for certiorari. Finally, those firms whose
contracts are threatened with cancellation may complicate matters
further by residing outside the jurisdiction of the court and refusing
to join in the suit.'"
By definitiOn, all government contracts "are vital to the functions
performed by the sovereign,"125 but in only a small portion of the gov-
ernment's procurements, usually those involving exceptionally large
public expenditures, will delay resulting from judicial review under-
122 Since Blackhawk had not tendered as evidence all documents possibly relevant
to a motion for summary judgment, the court refrained from entering such judgment for
the government, and remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to enter
summary judgment unless Blackhawk could demonstrate that there was a genuine issue
of material fact. Id. at 16.
123
 Id. at 5-6.
124 Several interesting questions outside the scope of this article are raised in con-
nection with the status of the firms whose contracts are the subject of these suits. Under
Rule 19 of the Federal' Rules of Civil Procedure, is the firm an "indispensable party"
which must be joined in the action if the suit is to proceed? If it is not indispensable
and is not joined, what consideration will the court give to its position? If the firm
need not be joined, should 'it choose to intervene under RuIe'24 in the jurisdiction chosen
by the plaintiff, or should it hold back and then consider appealing an adverse decision
or starting a new suit in another jurisdiction? •
122 See text at note 123 supra.
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mine any . national goal. Most government contracts involve formally
advertised procurements for commercial items. Where the government,
state or federal, purchases commercial goods, a cancellation of a public
contract for such items may not be unduly onerous. In fact, state courts
have occasionally held that unsuccessful bidders have standing to sue
to cancel such contracts,"° and have afforded injunctive relief as
well.127 In short, most items procured by the government do not sig-
nificantly involve the defense, security, safety or health of the nation,
and may be promptly re-procured or completed by another contractor
in the event a court directs cancellation of the original contract award.
However, in major federal procurements for complex military or
space hardware, or for other research and development items or ser-
vices, cancellation of partially completed projects often means the
government and the new contractor must start again from the begin-
ning. Usually, there is no existing stock to be procured elsewhere. The
anticipated product has such individual complexity that the incomplete
work of one contractor usually cannot be used as a foundation for an-
other contractor. The acuteness of the problem in these procurements
must be seen in this perspective—in many military, space and other
procurements, late delivery simply: is not an alternative because the
items are esential for programs and goals which either must be achieved
in accordance with. the schedule contemplated by the contract, or not
achieved at all. These goals and programs are those which elected
officials have decided are required in the public interest. If the agents
responsible for reaching them are not "private attorney generals,"
they are at least as much surrogates for a public interest as unsuccess-
ful bidders.
The procurement method most commonly employed to accomplish
these national goals is negotiation. The procurement procedures in the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 1 ' and the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949' have similar provisions
covering both negotiated and advertised procurements. The latter Act
governed the advertised procurements at issue in Scanwell and Black-
hawk. However, since both procurement statutes have similar purposes,
one must surmise that standing granted under the latter would not be
126 See McQuillan, Municipal Corporations If 29.83.
127 Id. at fl 29.85.
128 10 U.S.C. H 2301-14 (1964).
128 41 U.S.C. H 251-60 (1964). 
no Indeed, the District Court for the District of Columbia recently issued a pre-
liminary injunction against awarding a proposed Army contract. Schoonmaker • Co. , v.
Resor, C.A. No. 1760-70 (D.D.C. June 26, 1970). The same court also issued a•preliminary
injunction against the award of an Air Force contract. Fermont v. Seamans, C.A. No.
1330-70 (D.D.C. May 28, 1970). A temporary restraining order was also issued against
the Air Force by a federal court in California. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Thiokol Chem.
Co., C.A. No. 70-1493 (July 15, 1970), and a contract awarded by the Air Force was
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withheld under the former."' Moreover, as indicated above, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has predicated standing in
government contract cases on the APA rather than on the intent of the
relevant procurement statute allegedly violated. Were it otherwise
predicated, one could at least argue that Congress did not intend to
have procurements for the national defense disrupted by court action.
Both procurement statutes also provide for negotiation in certain
enumerated circumstances,' and both have been implemented by
agency regulations which can have the force of law."' The regula-
tions implementing those portions of the statutes which establish the
rules for conducting procurements by advertising are simple, at least
in their general purpose, which is to see that the contract is awarded
to a capable firm which has submitted the lowest price and has agreed
to do precisely the work specified in the invitation for bids. According
to these regulations, the work must be specified in sufficient detail
to allow evaluation of all bids on a common basis. The regulations
which govern negotiation are separate and distinct from those which
cover advertised procurement. Negotiated procurement is cryptically
defined as procurement which is not conducted by formal advertis-
ing."' The regulations provide, in substance, that in a competitive
negotiation the contracting officer must consider the experience and
management, the degree of technical ability, and the submitted prices
of each competitor.184 Lastly, after considering these factors, the
contracting officer must decide which competitor offers the most at-
tractive performance to the government. 13' Price, althought not nec-
essarily controlling, must be considered in this matter."' Obviously,
there often may be no common basis of evaluation. The Comptroller
General of the United States has remarked:
Negotiation procedures, unlike those required for formal ad-
vertising, are designed to be flexible and informal. These pro-
cedures properly permit the contracting officer to do things
in the awarding of a negotiated contract that would be a rad-
recently cancelled in Lloyd Wood Const. Co. v. Sandoval, C.A. 70-426 (N.D. Ala. August
13, 1970).
181
 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) ; 41 U.S.C. 252(c).
132 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 255 (1963).
183 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2302(2) (1964) ; ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 1.201-11 (1970) ;
NASAPR, 41 C.F.R. 18-3.100 (1970) ; FPR, 41 C.F.R. 1-1.218 (1970).
184 See, e.g., ASPR 32 C.F.R. 3.101 (1970). Noncompetitive negotiations, those in
which only one firm is solicited for an offer, are not considered in this discussion. It
has been noted, however, that Ballerina may provide a basis for- challenging sole-source
solicitations.
133 See, e.g., ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 3.805-2 (1970).
188 See 40 Comp. Gen. 35 (1960) ; 40 Comp. Gen. 508 (1960) ; Comp. Gen. Ms.
Dees. B-167508 (Dec. 8, 1969) ; B-159540 (Jan. Il, 1967) ; B-161676 (Aug. 22, 1966) ;
B-163166 (April 5, 1968).
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ical violation of the law if the procurement were being ac-
complished by formal advertising. . . . The emphasis here
is on permitting the contracting officer to take a course of
action which would be of great benefit to Government.'"
At present, the courts of appeals have not ruled on whether stand-
ing should be afforded to an unsuccessful offeror who wishes to chal-
lenge a negotiated contract.'sa No sound reason appears why standing
to contest advertised contracts will not be extended to contracts ne-
gotiated pursuant to the same statutes. However, the latitude which the
federal procurement statutes give the contracting officers in determin-
ing who should receive a negotiated contract award might appear to
the most litigous competitors as a formidable impediment to winning
a law suit."' Were this in fact the case, one would anticipate that the
disruption of negotiated contracts for defense, security, safety and
health would subside quickly, as soon as the prospective plaintiffs dis-
covered that virtually whatever the contracting officer did in negoti-
ating a contract was within the latitude of his proper discretion.
However, this latitude is not quite so omnifarious.
First, it has been held that a government contract awarded in 1962
was illegal and properly cancelled where, in contravention of published
negotiation regulations, the government agency did not consider price
in determining which firm was entitled to the contract."" The statute
involved was the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949. 141 However, the court looked to the legislative intent behind
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 1" to discover that Con-
gress required both military and civilian agencies to consider price in
determining who wins a negotiated procurement.'"
The court noted that the contract involved was not a cost-reim-
bursement contract or one for research and development.''* These
latter contracts are most frequently employed to obtain those national
137 47 Comp. Gen. 279, 284 (1967).
188 The District Court for the District of Columbia has clone so in Forera Corp. v.
AVCO Corp. and Shultz, Secretary of Labor, C.A. No. 1509-70. The plaintiff, which was
required to post a $2000 bond, obtained a temporary restraining order on May 19, 1970,
against a negotiated contract to operate a jab corps center. Also see Schoonmaker Co, v.
Resor, supra note 130, where the plaintiff had standing to challenge the negotiations in
the first step of a "two step advertised" procurement.
189
 See United States v. Gray Line, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Or. 1962), where the court,
after holding that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge the award of a government
contract, indicated that the plaintiff would have, had no case anyway in view of the
Secretary of the Interior's discretion under 16 U.S.C. jf 3 to award without advertising,
and to negotiate with any offeror.
140
 Schoenbrod v. United States, 410 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
141 41 U.S.C. ft 251-60 (1964).
142 10 U.S.C. HI 2301-14 (1964).
148 410 F.2d at 402-03.
144 410 F.2d at 402.
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objectives which will suffer if their procurement is subjected to court
suits. Nevertheless, the legislative intent discovered by the court made
no distinction between the negotiation criteria applied to cost-reim-
bursement or research and development contracts and all other ne-
gotiated contracts.. Moreover, whatever distinction there was in 1962
may have been eradicated by Pub. L. 87-653, which provides in part:
In all negotiated procurements in excess of $2500 in
- which rates or prices are not fixed by law or regulation and
in which time of delivery will permit, proposals including
price shall be solicited from the maximum number of quail-
fied sources consistent with the nature and requirements
of the supplies or services to be procured, and written or oral
discussions shall be conducted with all responsible offerors
who submit proposals within a competitive range, price, and
other factors considered: . . . . (Emphasis added.) 1'5
The quoted portion of the statute does not merely provide stat-
utory support for cancellation of a negotiated contract where the
government has failed to consider price in choosing a contractor. It
also requires that proposals be solicited from the maximum number
of qualified sources and that oral or written discussions be held with
all firms which submit offers within a competitive range."'
Since the federal courts have not, until Scanwell, granted unsuc-
cessful bidders standing to sue, they have not had an opportunity to
consider what is required of an agency when it negotiates a contract.
However, the Comptroller General has issued a number of decisions
interpreting the statutes and regulations which govern negotiated pro-
curement. Since the Comptroller's office has been the only forum in
which unsuccessful offerors have contested negotiated procurement
procedures, an examination of his decisions should provide some in-
dication of the issues and conclusions which might be expected in
future court decisions concerning negotiated procurement. Further-
more, the Comptroller's decisions may at least provide the basis upon
which standing itself is granted. The rationale of the Ballerina and
Blackhawk decisions is that a plaintiff meets the Supreme Court test
for standing by being "arguably" within the "zone of interests" pro-
tected by the relevant statute, if he alleges the government procure-
145 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1964) as amended by Pub. L. 90-500, Sept. 20, 1968. The
Comptroller has 'held that the requirements of this section apply to cost-reimburiement
and research and development contracts. 47 Comp. Gen. 336 (1967) ; 45 Comp. Gen.
417 (1966).
140 Although Pub. L. 87-653 does not apply to civilian agencies other than NASA,
FPR, 41 C.F.R. 1-3.101(d), 1-3.805 have adopted similar requirements for those civilian
agencies. Whether the regulations are a proper implementation of the civilian procurement
statute and, therefore, have the force and effect of law, remains to be judicially determined.
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ment procedures violated the mandateof that statute. The procurement
statutes rarely explain in detail what procedures must be employed by
government contracting officers. The regulations implementing those
statutes are not always a clear expression of what Congress intended to
be minimum prerequisites to a legal contract award. Therefore, ev-
idence that the Comptroller General! had held procedures similar to
those alleged by a plaintiff to be illegal violations of the relevant pro-
curement statute or regulations, might persuade a court that the
plaintiff was "arguably" within the critical "zone of interests," and
consequently had standing to sue.
VI. THE DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
ON NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT: AN ALLUSION TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW WITH EXECUTIVE CHAOS
In two recent decisions, 147 the Comptroller General concluded that
the government did not solicit proposals from the maximum number
of qualified sources as required by the provisions of the procurement
statutes or regulations dealing with negotiation. The Comptroller found
that the procuring agency involved failed to solicit proposals from
certain firms potentially able to perform the contract. In the first de-
cision,148
 the Comptroller held that in a brand-name-or-equal procure-
ment,'" the degree of competition contemplated by the statute and the
regulations was not obtained by sending a solicitation to several firms
not including the producer of the brand name. In the second opin-
ion, 1" the Comptroller reached a similar result by relying on Section
1 -3.101 of the Federal Procurement Regulations, which provides that
negotiated procurement "shall be on a competitive basis to the max-
imum practical extent.' In the latter decision, the Comptroller held
that the General Services Administration should have sent a solicita-
tion to an incumbent lessor even though earlier the lessor had quoted
a price for renovation which indicated that his offer on the lease would
have exceeded the legal cost limit Ina
Even where an agency has solicited proposals from the maximum
number of qualified sources there is no assurance that the agency will
conduct discussions with those sources. Indeed, in accordance with
147 48 Comp. Gen. 722 (1969) ; 46 Comp. Gen. 600 (1967).
148 46 Comp. Gen. 600 (1967).
148 This type of procurement is one in which the specifications merely identify a
particular product or products and the salient features thereof.
150
 48 Comp. Gen. 722 (1969). The contract was not cancelled because of the
considerable expense the successful contractor had incurred prior to the decision. Id. at
726-27.
181
 41 C.F.R. 1-3.101.
162
 The cost limitation was one imposed by the Economy Act, 40 U.S.C. 1 278(a)
(1964).
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Section 2304(g) of the Armed Services Procurement Act,' the agency
may decide that discussions with any of the solicited firms are un-
necessary if "it can be clearly demonstrated from the existence of
adequate competition or accurate prior cost experience with the prod-
uct, that acceptance of an initial proposal without discussion would
result in fair and reasonable prices." 154
 However, the Comptroller
General has observed that it is a questionable practice to negotiate
with only one firm on the basis of "accurate prior cost information"
where the prior procurements were not competitive.' Moreover, the
Comptroller maintains that the statutory section which provides that
discussions with all firms in the competitive range need not be con-
ducted where acceptance of the initial proposal will result in a reason-
able price" is operative only if the agency does not conduct discus-
sions with any of the competitors.'" He has also held that a clear
violation of the statute occurs when the procuring agency, instead of
entering into the contract on the basis of the reasonably priced initial
proposal, conducts negotiations only with the firm offering that pro-
posal, and deletes a material requirement from the contract. 158
Procuring agencies may also decide that discussions or negoti-
ations should be conducted with only one firm because only that firm's
proposal is within the "competitive range." However, the Comptroller
General has, on one occasion," overruled an agency's selection of
IBM and reversed its determination that Honeywell was not within
the competitive range because the latter firm had failed a benchmark
test." The Comptroller stated:
When the application of a mandatory benchmark test
requirement results, as in this case, in leaving one proposer,
and its price is, initially at least, substantially in excess of the
153 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) 1964).
154
 Id.
155 48 Comp. Gen. 605 (1969). However, the Comptroller did not think that "the
Government's best interest would be served if the awards were cancelled at this time."
Id. at 612.
156 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g)(1964).
157 48 Comp. Gen. 605(1969); 46 Comp. Gen. 191 (1966); Comp. Gen. Ms. Dec.
B-165837 (March 28, 1969); B-161448 (February 7, 1968); B-158528 (April 26, 1967).
159 48 Comp. Gen. 663 (1969). The contract was not cancelled because of the con-
tractor's advanced status of production. Id. at 668. See also, Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs.
B-165084-165691(2) (April 11, 1969).
159 47 Comp. Gen. 29 (1967). Generally, however, the Comptroller General considers
that a determination of competitive range is a matter of administrative discretion. See,
e.g., 46 Comp. Gen. 606 (1967); Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-168603 (February 13, 1970);
B-166052 (May 20, 1969); B-165488 (January 17, 1969); 13-163024 (August 27, 1968);
B-164313 (July 5, 1968). The Comptroller may, however, be extremely critical of a de-
termination excluding a given firm from the competitive range. See Camp. Gen. Ms. Decs.
B-158042 (March 30, 1966).
109 A benchmark test is an examination of the program capabilities of a computer
system wherein the system is required to perform a series of hypothetical tests.
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price of another proposer we believe the spirit and intent [of
10 U.S.C. § 2304(g)] would not be served without further
discussion to determine whether the other proposal can be
improved to meet the benchmark requirement.
Concededly, both IBM and Honeywell are responsible
offerors. Discussions were conducted, at least with Honey-
well, after proposals were submitted in December 1966. The
only justification for refusing to continue discussions with
Honeywell after it failed the benchmark test would be a de-
termination that its proposal was not within a competitive
range, price, and other factors considered. When the bench-
mark test left only one proposer as an eligible contractor, we
do not believe that a 200 hour benchmark test, which was
the only test Honeywell failed, should have been considered
determinative of what constituted a "competitive range" with-
out regard to price."'
As a result, the Comptroller ruled that the Honeywell proposal should
have been considered within the competitive range, and that further
discussions with Honeywell should have taken place before source
selection.'"
Whether a proposal ranks within the competitive range depends
upon how well it is scored in accordance with criteria which the
procuring agency has selected for evaluating proposals. Often, how-
ever, offerors are not informed of the evaluation criteria applicable to
their proposals or of the relative importance of those criteria. Recently
the Comptroller held that the absence of this information in a solic-
itation for offers to supply statistical analytical support required the
cancellation of that solicitation.163 He also stated that the failure to
provide offerors with this information is not in accordance with sound
procurement policy and the public interest, and that his office may
direct the cancellation of a contract which is clearly contrary to the
public interest.'"
The Comptroller General has often held that a proposal need not
be considered to be within the competitive range, and thereby require
discussion, if the procuring agency considers the proposal so "tech-
161 47 Comp. Gen. at 53-54.
182 Id. In Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-169645(1) (July 24, 1970), the Comptroller
expressed serious reservations that the "competitive range" could not be properly de-
termined by using a pre-established minimum point scale.
106 Camp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-169645, supra, note 162.
164 See also Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-168958 (May 28, 1970) and B-169382 (July
9, 1970), in which the Comptroller recommended to the procuring agencies that they
terminate apparently legal contracts under certain termination clauses in the contracts
because proper procurement procedures were not utilized.
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nically inferior" as to render meaningful discussions an impossibility.'
In one decision, however, the Comptroller concluded that negotiations
for a $3 million research and development contract were unjustifiably
limited to a firm which had, in the opinion of the procuring agency,
submitted a proposal of "substantial superiority." 168 In reaching the
decision, the Comptroller explained that the term "negotiation" gen-
erally implies a series of offers and counter-offers until a mutually
satisfactory agreement is reached by the parties. He stated:
In this context, we believe that an obligation to negotiate .. .
existed notwithstanding that [the one] proposal was de-
termined to be technically superior . . . We find nothing in
the record which would indicate that [the, other] proposal
was so technically inferior as to preclude any possibility of
meaningful negotiations with such offeror. This is what both
the law and the ASPR [Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions] require in order to assure the competition contem-
plated .1"
In addition to reversing an agency determination that a particular
proposal is so technically inferior that meaningful discussions are
precluded, the Comptroller has also held that the maximum competi-
tion contemplated by the statute was not obtained by the agency when
it failed to condtict discussions with an offeror who did not supply
sufficient information to determine if his offer was technically accept-
able."8
The Comptroller observed:
Unlike the case of a Request for Proposal for a research and
development contract when precise engineering and scientific
data would be the heart of the proposal, a few instances of
186 Camp. Gen. Ms. Decs. 5-167508 (December 8, 1969) ; B-166213 (July 18, 1969) ;
48 Comp. Gen. 314 (1968) ; B-160620 (March 13, 1967) ; B-161676 (August 22, 1966) ;
B-159540 (January 11, 1967). The Comptroller's reluctance to question an agency's
competitive range determination on the basis of the proposal being technically unaccept-
able stems from his traditional position that his office does not have technical expertise
and therefore does not question an agency's technical judgment unless dearly arbitrary.
See, e.g., 40 Comp. Gen. 294, 297 (1960). However, a court will not operate under the
same constraints and presumably will consider such questions as whether the specifica-
tions are unduly restrictive and whether a firm's offer to meet a given specification is
in fact "technically unacceptable."
lee 45 Comp. Gen. 417, 425 (1966). Cf. 45 Comp. Gen. 749 (1966) indicating that
in a competition between two firms, a proposal by one which represents a substantial
breakthrough in the state of the art may be so substantially superior to the other as
to be the only one in the competitive range. See also, Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-169429
(August 21, 1970).
107 45 Comp. Gen. at 427. The Comptroller concluded, however, that "practical
considerations preclude our disturbing the award." Id. Id. at 433.
108 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-159796 (November -30, 1966).
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insufficient data or detail are not ordinarily an adequate rea-
son for rejecting without discussion a low bid on a common
article of industrial equipment.'"
The most interesting conflicts between the wide discretion given
the contracting officer in negotiated procurement and the restrictions
placed on that discretion by the requirements in section 2304(g) 170
for discussions with competitive offerors, occur in those cases in which
the agency has conducted discussions with several offerors but, never-
theless, is found by the Comptroller General not to have complied with
the statutory mandates. For example, the Comptroller has observed,
"it is axiomatic that the contracting officer enjoys the widest possible
range of discretion in the evaluation of negotiated proposals and in
determining which offer or proposal is entitled to be accepted as in the
Government's best interest.""" However, the Comptroller then pro-
ceeded to rule that the requirements of the negotiated procurement
statute had not been met because the cost negotiations conducted by
the contracting officer with all three offerors were not "meaningful." 172
Instead of cancelling the award, which was considered impractical in
view of the circumstances of the case, the Comptroller directed the
agency not to exercise a contract option for a second year of services.
From the procuring agency's point of view, the rulings of the
Comptroller General present difficult problems of statutory compliance.
For example, during the course of often hectic negotiations, the ques-
tions of how a procuring agency is to determine which areas of defi-
ciency in a proposal it should discuss with the offeror, and the extent
to which it should continue to discuss any given area are presented.
In one decision, however, the Comptroller observed:
To point out during negotiations every area in which another
offeror has achieved a high point score or provided more
detail is not only not required by statute or regulation, but
in fact is specifically precluded by ASPR 3-805.1(b) which
prohibits the use of "auction techniques.""a
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for a procuring agency to perceive
which areas must be discussed in order to comply with the statute."'
100
 Id. at 4. The award was not cancelled because such action would have caused a
two month delay in the delivery of a critically needed item. Id. See also, Comp. Gen.
Ms. Decs. B-167291(1) (December 1, 1969).
170 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1964).
171 47 Comp. Gen. at 341.
172 The contracting officer discovered that the proposer? cost estimates were un-
realistic; these estimates had not been discussed during the initial negotiations, and
negotiations were not reopened to discuss them.
MI Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-164552(2) (February 24, 1969) at 6.
174 See 47 Comp. Gen. 252 (1967), where the agency's discussions were clearly
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The Comptroller has also issued a number of decisions in the
situation where the procuring agency wishes to bring the discussions
to a close with some or all competitors. Here a difficulty often arises
because the military procurement regulation which calls for the re-
jection of late proposals or late proposal modifications also calls for
discussions which' may generate changes in the initial proposals. In
these instances, offerors will be uncertain as to whether these changes
will be ignored on the basis of lateness, or considered under the reg-
ulation permitting negotiations.'" The Comptroller believes that every
solicitation in a negotiated procurement should incorporate a "cut-off"
date for the submission of proposals. Furthermore, in cases where
discussions are to be conducted, a cut-off date should likewise be
established for the submission of proposed modifications.'" He has
stated that modifications submitted after the cut-off date should not
be considered, but if no such date has been established, untimely
offers should be considered regardless of how late or administratively
burdensome those offers are."'
In 48 Comp. Gen. 536 (1969), two competitors initially refused
to amend their proposals in order to make them acceptable to the De-
partment of the Navy. Later, the small business firm which had sub-
mitted the less attractive offer acquiesced to the Navy requirements.
However, a question concerning that firm's responsibility arose and
was referred to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for resolu-
tion. 178 Favorable action by SBA appeared both probable and im-
minent.'" At this point, however, the small business firm's competitor
submitted a modification to his proposal and withdrew his initial
exception to the Navy specifications. Because no cut-off date for
proposal modifications had been established, the Navy asked both
offerors to confirm their proposals by a specific date and advised them
that any revisions after that date would be considered late. Both
offerors confirmed their proposals. Since the competitor of the small
business firm had initially submitted the most attractive offer, the Navy
inadequate with respect to both cost and technical aspects of a proposal, notwithstanding
that an elaborate and no doubt expensive "proposal Evaluation Board" had helped to
determine the scope of those discussions. See also, Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-167492,
(August 12, 1969), holding the Navy should discuss its decision with a potential new
supplier that $40,000 represented the government's additional cost to purchase products
notinterchangeable with those previously bought from a sole-source.
175 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-161782 (March 25, 1968) (letter to the Secretary of
the Navy).
170 Comp. Gen. Ms. Dees. B-151944 (March 19, 1969) (Letter to GSA).
ITT Id.
178 Generally, the SBA is the final arbiter of whether a small business firm, as
here, is competent to perform a contract. 15 U.S.C. 637(b) (7) (1964).
170 The facts do not disclose whether the small business firm's competitor was also
a small business, or whether it had any knowledge of the action the SBA appeared
ready to take.
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proposed to award the contract to that firm. Prior to awarding the
contract, the small business firm lodged a protest with the Comptroller
General who ruled that the proposed award would be open to serious
question because negotiations had not been properly closed. On the
issue of properly closing negotiations, the Comptroller held that offer-
ors should be advised (1) that negotiations are being conducted; (2)
that offerors are being asked for their best and final offer, not merely
to confirm or reconfirm prior offers, and finally; (3) that revision must
be submitted by the date specified.'" Since the offerors had not been
advised that negotiations were being conducted and that they should
submit their best and final offers, the Comptroller directed the Navy
to conduct further discussions before making any award.
In another decision of the Comptroller,'" the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) was involved in discussions with three offerors
including one Wilcox. In this case, the agency did establish a cut-off
date for submission of proposal modifications. Wilcox submitted a
modification which would have made its offer the lowest in terms of
price. The modification was not considered by the FAA, however, be-
cause it was received after the established cut-off date. Thereafter, and
largely because of funding problems, the FAA requested Airborne
Instruments Laboratories, which had submitted the most favorable
timely offer, to modify its offer to one for a multi-year contract.' 82
The offer was to provide that delivery would be extended over a
two year period, and that in the event the contract was cancelled,
there would be a charge against the government of up to nine percent
of the contract price. Airborne agreed to the modifications and was
awarded the contract.
In resolving the controversy between Wilcox, Airborne and the
FAA, the Comptroller stated that in his view the contract should be
cancelled and further discussions should be conducted with the parties.
He reasoned that as long as negotiations are open, every offeror has a
right to change his price for any reason and that, under Section 1-3.805
of the Federal Procurement Regulations,'" Wilcox should have been
allowed to exercise that right when the FAA reopened discussions with
Airborne.'" The Comptroller was of the opinion that this should be
the result even where, as here, the changes to which Airborne agreed
180 48 Comp. Gen. at 542,
181 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-167386 (December 22, 1969).
182 A multi-year contract is a contract which is firm for one year's requirements
and under its terms may extend beyond that year for another increment of requirements.
See ASPR 1-322, 32 C.F.R. 1-322.
188 41 C.F.R. 1-3.805.
184 The language of Section 1-3.805 of the FPR indicates that discussions are not
necessarily essential, as they are under 10 U.S.C. 2304(g), in cost-reimbursement or
research and development contracts.
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gave it no advantage and prejudiced no other offeror.' 85 Despite his
conclusions, the Comptroller did not direct cancellation of the contract.
Instead, he requested the FAA to negotiate an agreement between all
the parties which-would best serve the interests of the government.'"
However, he required that if such an agreement could not be reached,
the matter would be returned to him for his consideration of the cost
of cancelling the second year's requirements of the contract.
In 48 Comp. Gen. 583 (1969), the General Steel Tank Company
submitted the most-
 favorable offer to each of several amendments of
the Marine Corps' original solicitation for bridges to be used in South
Vietnam. The last amendment reduced the contract's requirement from
eleven bridges to eight. Only General Steel, having submitted the most
favorable offer, was asked to submit a revised proposal. Within one
day, which was the established cut-off period for submission of a re-
vised offeriGeneral Steel advised the Corps that there would be no
price increase. Thereafter, the Marine Corps realized that it should
have solicited offers on the revised quantity from General Steel's
competitors. The Corps adopted this procedure and allowed each of the
competitors a one day cut-off for revisions. One of the competitors
submitted an offer which was more favorable than that of General
Steel and was awarded the contract.
The Comptroller held that the procedure followed by the Marine
Corps "deviated from the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) and
regulations so materially as ordinarily would warrant cancellation of
the award and the reopening of negotiations with all offerors in the
competitive range."'" One of the deviations from the statute perceived
by the Comptroller was that the Marine Corps established two separate
cut-off dates for modifications, one for General Steel and another for
its competitors, rather than a common cut-off date for all offerors.
The requirement for a common cut-off date was derived from the fact
that the regulations implementing the statute call for a simultaneous
notice of a cut-off date, thus implying an intent that there should be a
common cut-off date for all offerors. Moreover, the Comptroller
concluded that the separate dates may have prejudiced General Steel.'"
188
 Cf. B-165837 (March 28, 1969) and 48 Comp. Gen. 449 (1968), two earlier
decisions not cited in .the instant decision, where the improper reopening of negotiations
with only, one competitor in one case, and the improper closing of negotiations in another,
was not held illegal because those actions did not prejudice competing offerors.
188 No agreement was ever. reached. Of more importance, however, is the fact that
the Comptroller found that the civilian regulations imposed on an agency legal obligations
to conduct discussions properly. See also, 48 Comp. Gen. 722 . (1969) ; Comp. Gen. Ms.
Decs. B-169429 (August 21, 1970).
187
 48 Comp. Gen. at 593.
188 The contract was not cancelled due to, the urgency of the military requirements
and the substantial termination costs which would have ensued. See Comp. Gen. Ms.
Decs. B-169429 (August 21, 1970).
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In addition, the Comptroller General believes that the procedures
contemplated by 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) not only require that proposal
modifications have a common cut-off date where the absence of one
might prejudice a competitor, but also require that offerors be given
equal time for consideration and submissions of such proposals.'" In a
recent decision,'" the Comptroller appeared more concerned with the
latter requirement of the statute. In this case, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) proposed to award a
contract to General Electric (GE). The latter's competitor, Fairchild-
Hiller, was required to submit its proposal modifications one week
earlier than GE. The Comptroller found, inter alia, that the disparity
in submission dates created a situation prejudicial to Fairchild which
claimed that if it had been afforded an additional week to negotiate
with its subcontractors or develop cost saving methods prior to sub-
mitting its modifications, it might have reduced its cost proposal in the
same manner as did GE. The Comptroller advised NASA to reconsider
its proposed award to GE, and subsequently, NASA awarded the con-
tract to Fairchild.
The decisions of the Comptroller General do not necessarily fore-
cast what conclusions the courts will reach should they adopt the
Scanwell rule of conferring standing on unsuccessful bidders. Rather,
they indicate that the procurement statutes and regulations constitute
a dynamic body of law which is susceptible of varied interpretations.
More importantly, however, the decisions of the Comptroller General
involve the same issues arising out of negotiated procurements which
the courts will have to resolve if standing is to be afforded to unsuc-
cessful bidders. In this respect, they will serve as a valuable guide,
first, in resolving the issue of standing itself, and, second, in meeting
the substantive issues which will surely arise once standing is granted.
HoweVer, it should be noted that a court which holds that the
APA is applicable to government contracts may prove more circum-
spect than the Comptroller General in concluding that a contract was
illegally awarded. The soundness of this prophesy lies in the fact that
the Act appears to provide only for cancellation in the event of an
illegal award. Conversely the Comptroller General may, as was in-
dicated from an examination of several of his decisions, find that
although a procurement statute or regulation has been violated, prac-
tical considerations restrain him from advising the procuring agency
180 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-164728 (September 3, 1968) (letter to the Secretary of
Army). The existence of a common cut-off date and of equal time for the submission of
modifications after discussions appear to be mutually exclusive unless discussions are
conducted simultaneously with all competitors, a practice which is rarely if ever , followed.
190 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-169535 (July 2, 1970).
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that he will disallow any payments made pursuant to a contract that
he regards as illegally awarded.' •
The Comptroller has exercised such restraint in determining
whether the violation of a procurement statute or, regulation must
result in the cancellation of a government contract that his office
oftentimes appears ineffective. For example, in one decision, the Comp-
troller advised the Secretary of the Army that if another contract was
awarded where discussions were limited to one firm simply because
that firm's initial proposal was a reasonable one, that contract "will
be considered void ab initio by this office.'" Subsequently, the
Comptroller issued several decisions on the same issue reaching the
same conclusion. Despite his protestations, none of the contracts in-
volved were declared void.'" Indeed, less than a year had elapsed after
his first decision to the Secretary of the Army before a second decision
followed on the identical point; the contract was not cancelled.'"
In his second decision to the Secretary of the Army, the Comp-
troller concluded:
The procurement deviated from requirements of the law and
regulation in matters material enough to warrant cancellation
of the award under ordinary circumstances. However, we are
not unmindful of the fact that this is a high priority emer-
gency procurement. Therefore, we would not direct cancella-
tion if such action would result in delaying deliveries of the
end items. If, on the other hand, the instant contract can be
cancelled without any adverse effect on military posture, we
think such action is required. 1°5
The items being procured were telephone terminals which the Depart-
ment of Defense had determined were urgently needed for the military
effort in Southeast Asia.'" The Comptroller General's failure to cancel
this contract may contribute to the criticism that his office is ineffec-
tive in this area. However, the criticism might become more intense
if the Comptroller, and. now the courts, began to cancel contracts
101 In Reiner Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), the court held that
since the illegality of a contract cancelled at the direction of the Comptroller General was
not plain, the contract was lawful, not void. The court opined that the Comptroller
directed cancellation of contracts on the basis of whether procurement policy had been
ignored, and not necessarily on whether the contract was illegal. The Comptroller dis-
avowed the authority that the court imputed to his office. See 44 Comp. Gen. 221, 223
(1964) ; cf. Decisions cited at note 164 supra.
192 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-158528 (April 26, 1967), at 13.
103 See 48 Comp. Gen. 605 (1969): 48 Comp. Gen. 663 (1969); Comp. Gen. Ms.
Decs. B-165837 (March 28, 1969).
194 Comp. Gen. Ms. Decs. B-1614.48 (February 7, 1968).
195 Id. at II.
196 Id. at 1.
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involving military supplies for use in South Vietnam, space experiments
which can be conducted only once every 20 years, educational or
housing programs or crime-prevention studies designed to meet cam-
paign promises which an administration believes were a major factor
in its election, or, finally, defense systems which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend as necessary for protection against imminent threats
to our national security.
It is submitted that the major point of significance here is not
that the Comptroller has been too ready to declare contracts illegal or
too lax in cancelling them, but rather to suggest that if courts are to
entertain suits from unsuccessful bidders under the Administrative
Procedure Act they will not have a workable rationale to avoid can-
celling illegal contracts in those situations where good sense and the
national interest clearly dictate that result. The other side of the coin,
however, is that without judicial review, there is no effective restraint
on the manner by which the executive branch of the government
expends the $50 billion which Congress appropriates each year for
the procurement of necessary goods and services. Not only the enor-
mous expenditure itself, but also the procedures by which this money
is allocated, has a tremendous impact on the patterns of our economy.
Government contracts have become the lifeblood of many firms and
communities, and the procedures employed to award the contracts may
determine which firms and communities prosper and which atrophy.
Furthermore, government contracts have become an important vehicle
by which the government attempts to implement various policies con-
cerning poverty, small businesses, environmental control, equal em-
ployment, the balance of payments, labor standards and fair wages.
These policies may at times tend to undermine an executive agency's
desire to accomplish a government program in the most effective man-
ner at the least possible cost. In short, government procurement has
assumed such an important , and vital position in the economy and
general well-being of the nation that judical review of the procure-
ment process was predictable, and now, barring an unexpected reversal
of the trend by Congress, it appears virtually inevitable. The unfavor-
able consequences of this result, however, need not be inevitable.
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT EXECUTIVE CHAOS:
A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
The Perkins decision concluded that judicial review of government
contracts would disrupt the even and expeditious functioning of gov-
ernment.'" The court in Lind v. Stoats"' expressed concern over the
107 See p. 5 infra.
198 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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damage and delay which would be done to government business if
unsuccessful bidders were allowed to use the injunctive power of the
courts. Both decisions assumed, not unreasonably, that the consequence
of litigation by an unsuccessful offeror is interference with the pro-
curement process. Also, the decisions recognized that, if successful,
such suits will result in government responsibility for the cost of
overlap or duplication in the work performed by the competing con-
tractors. Finally, it has been indicated that interference with some
procurethents may destroy the efficacy of many government "priority"
programs which are closely related to important national goals. These
consequences, however, need not result from allowing unsuccessful
offerors to sue in government contract cases.
In the absence of new legislation, a court following the Scanwell
line of cases has available at least three methods by which it can
avoid cancelling a contract where such action would seriously inter-
fere with the defense, security, health or safety of the nation. First, a
court could rationalize the Perkins and Scanwell decisions as being
compatible, in that the strict holding of the former was that mere
potential bidders have no standing, while the latter held that actual
bidders who would have been awarded the contract but for the illegal
agency action do have sstanding. Thus, standing could be limited only
to actual bidders who stood next in line for the award.'"
Another way in which a court may avoid contract cancellation is
for it 'to declare that when a plaintiff charges the government with
arbitrary or capricious action, he must satisfy a high standard of
proofm and demonstrate that the government action was palpably
illegal.' The import of such a judicious sounding dictum could prove
to be that plaintiffs challenging the validity of important government
contracts could rarely if ever live up to the required standard of proof,
since the height of that standard would. appear to increase in propor-
tion to the amount of chaos which would be created by cancelling the
goVernment contract. Precedent might soon discourage most plaintiffs
frOm attempting, to challenge the award of a government contract.
Courts could also discourage actions to cancel certain government con-
tracts where the plaintiff's initial strategy is to seek a temporary re-
straining order and preliminary , injunction. This could be accomplished
.	 199 Since the Court. of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Ballerina that a
potential bidder has standing, it is obvious that it would hot accept this rationalization.
200 See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 173-69 (Ct. Cl., July 15, 1970) at
10, where the court discusses the standard of proof required of an unsuccessful bidder
suing for bid preparation expenses.
201 See Reiner v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (1963), concerning the standard of
proof that the government must meet to sustain its cancellation of a contract which it
believes was illegally awarded.
42
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS
by requiring the plaintiff to post a prohibitively high bond. 202 Requir-
ing the plaintiffs to meet an inordinately high standard of proof or to
post a prohibitively high bond would be unworthy of our judicial
system to the extent that both alternatives require the court to reach
conclusions or take actions almost totally independent of the legal
merits of the case before them. The posting of an unreasonably high
bond has the further disadvantage of making standing to sue in gov-
ernment contract cases a luxury which only large corporations would
be able to afford 208 Finally, none of the above methods effectively
forecloses the possibility of law suits, successful or not, which will
severely disrupt the procurement process by which important national
policies are implemented. Such a result should not be accepted where
a viable alternative is available which gives due regard to our aim of
assuring that all contractors be treated in accordance with fair and
established rules while still maintaining the strength of the procure-
ment process and, in turn, the national goals which it implements.
Legislation may be necessary to achieve an equitable balance be-
tween the competing goals of judicial review and an efficient procure-
ment system?" Possibly the most promising alternative to avoiding
the chaos of allowing all unsuccessful offerors to sue would be an
amendment to the APA or the procurement statutes which would pro-
vide for a new remedy in government contract cases as a substitute
for those presently contained in the Act. Presently, the APA authorizes
the court to hold unlawful and set aside illegal agency action, and to
202 Under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 65c, 28 U.S.C.A. (1964), a court may refuse
to issue such an order or injunction unless the plaintiff posts a bond in an amount
sufficient to cover the costs and damages the government may incur as a result of having
been wrongfully restrained or enjoined. In many government contract cases, the costs
which possibly could result from delay would easily exceed the cost of the item being
purchased. Where a contract involving the defense, security, health or safety of the
nation was being challenged, a court might be tempted to set the amount of the bond
at whatever cost could possibly result from the delay, rather than the amount which
would probably result.
2" The situation may already exist because probably only large corporations or
those heavily dependent on government contracts can afford to undertake a suit which,
even if successful, may bring only the cancellation of a competitor's contract rather than
an immediate pecuniary benefit.
204 The APA or the procurement statutes could be amended to exempt government
contracts from judicial review. Many of those responsible for executing government pro-
grams would be relieved by this "solution," but little would be achieved toward a balance
of competing goals. Moreover, the Supreme Court has correctly observed that "where
statutes are concerned, the trend is toward , enlargement of the class of people who may
protest administrative action." Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Excepting government procurement statutes from
this trend does not reflect the important position which the procurement process occupies
in maintaining our national economy and well-being. The same disability applies to
suggestions that a new administrative tribunal, or an existing one, such as the Comptroller
General's office, be given exclusive jurisdiction and adequate powers and procedures with
respect to bitl protest matters.
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compel agency action unlawfully withheld 2" The Act could be
amended so as to provide that, in government contract cases, the only
remedy available to unsuccessful offerors would be an award of dam-
ages related to the profits the offeror would have enjoyed had proper
procurement procedures been followed .2"
If one concedes that an unsuccessful offeror who challenges a
government contract is not a "private attorney general" concerned
with the general welfare, but rather a businessman rightly concerned
with his profits, then it follows that his primary economic interest in
bringing the law suit can be served best by an award of damages. If a
court is empowered to award the profits which the plaintiff reasonably
anticipated from the contract had it been awarded to him, he should
not suffer undue regret over the loss of his chance to have the contract
award set aside and have the agency award the contract to him.
Furthermore, an award of damages as the unsuccessful offeror's
sole remedy has other virtues. For example, those who solicit govern-
ment contracts would be relieved of the drastic consequences that
would ensue should a court declare a contract void after the award
has been made. Indeed, a contractor who in good faith had begun
performance on what he considered to be a valid contract generally
would not be affected by the court challenge. Thus, he would be able
to continue performance on the contract and presumably receive the
profits he anticipated.207 Finally, and most importantly, this procedure
would assure that the government procurement process continues un-
hampered by the vicissitudes of court action, including the possibility
of contract cancellation. A suit for damages, in which the fear of
contract cancellation is not present, could proceed at its leisurely and
unpredictable pace without imposing those delays upon the procure-
ment process which are so clearly injurious to the public interest. The
cost of these gains for the public interest, however, is acceptance of
the not altogether palatable precept that the government may be re-
quired to pay contract damages to one who never received the contract.
Such a procedure would be considered preposterous in private industry,
where the primary obligation is to make a profit for one's stockholders.
The government as contractor, however, has an obligation not only to
get the most for the taxpayers' dollar, but also to treat fairly all those
205 5 U.S.C.§ 706 (1964) as amended by Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966.
206 Suits against the United States for damages in excess of $10,000 cannot be
brought in the district courts. 28 US.C. 1346(a)(2) (1964). Where anticipated profits
exceed this amount the action will have to be brought in the Court of Claims unless the
ceiling is lifted. See 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1964).
207 If this procedure is utilized and the court should find in favor of the unsuccessful
offeror, the government would have to pay the lost profits to two different contractors
for the same work. However, this should prove considerably less expensive than paying
for the costs incurred by both contractors, which may occur if the contract were cancelled.
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who deal with it and to comply with various socio-economic statutes
and regulations. If judicial review is to become a feasible means of
assuring that the government meets these often conflicting obligations,
that review, ironically, may have to be designed to allow an award of
damages under a contract the plaintiff never received.
However novel, the remedy of money damages for illegal contract
awards is not without precedent. In Heyer,2" the Court of Claims
granted standing to an unsuccessful offeror to recover his bid prepara-
tion expenses. The court reasoned that where there was a fraudulent
inducement for bids, the plaintiff could recover upon an implied promise
on the part of the government to consider honestly all solicited bids.
In a similar and more recent case decided after &unwell, the Court
of Claims concluded that the government's implied promise was oper-
ative without a fraudulent inducement. 2" Moreover, the court held
that the Scanwell decision
is broad enough to grant standing to a party seeking personal
money damages as well as to one acting as a quasi attorney
general for the benefit of the public. Regardless of the fact
that plaintiff in the instant case is seeking money damages, it
is still requiring the Government to enforce its regulations
fairly and honestly and treat all bidders without discrimina-
tion. Thus, plaintiff is acting both for itself and the good of
the public.'
The court did, however, refuse to allow the plaintiff to recover his
anticipated profits, stating that such an award would be improper
"since the contract under which the plaintiff would have made such
profits never actually came into existence." 2 " Moreover, the court
noted that "there is no way that it could be said for certain that had
Acme's bid [the low bid accepted by the procuring agency] been
rejected, the award would have been made to the plaintiff."" The
court failed to add that the APA, which sets forth with considerable
202 140 F. Supp 409 (Ct. CL 1956).
202 Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, supra note 200.
210 Id. at 8.
211 Id. at 10.
212 Id. at 10-11. The synthesis of the court's holdings in this area is that the govern-
ment, if it did not properly evaluate the plaintiff's bid, would breach an implied contract
Plaintiff could sue for bid preparation costs under either that contract or as a quasi
attorney general. Refusal to extend relief to lost profits is no longer based on the Perkins
rule of no standing to sue, but on the fact that an actual contract never came into
existence. What remains to be tested is whether the court having joined Scanwell in
rejecting Perkins, would now extend damages to include lost profits for breach of what
it might construe as an implied-in-fact contract. Such a development could put an end to
suits in district courts for Injunctive relief, since an adequate remedy at law would be
available to plaintiffs. Cf. Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, C.A. No. 2713-70 (September
9, 1970).
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specificity the remedies available, does not provide for an award of
damages.
The suggested amendment to the APA or to the procurement
statutes would overcome both of the court's reasons for not awarding
some measure of damages related to the plaintiff's anticipated profits.
Under the proposed amendment, it would not be necessary for a plain-
tiff to prove that he had a contract or that he would have received
the award had his competitor's bid been rejected. Rather,. the sole
issue before the court would be whether the plaintiff should have
received the contract had proper procurement procedures been fol-
lowed. Therefore, only a rare case would present the difficult question
of whether proper procurement procedures would have required the
procuring agency to reject all bids and re-solicit new offers, instead
of awarding the contract to the complaining bidder.
The problem of determining when proper procurement procedures
would have resulted in re-solicitation is not the only difficulty or
limitation generated by substituting the remedy of damages for one of
cancellation. None, however, appear quite so formidable as the conse-
quences of law suits seeking an injunction or a contract cancellation.
For example, entertaining suits for loss of anticipated profits would
sometimes create difficult problems in determining the amount of
anticipated profits, particularly where complex incentive-fee, award-fee
contracts were involved. However, courts in' the past have demon-
strated an ingenuity equal to similar tasks. They commonly face
baffling problems of damages in anti-trust suits:and rin suits for wrong-
ful default of a contract for a custom item.
Serious questions could also be raised as to whether a. plaintiff
suing for damages under a contract he never received should enjoy a
six-year statute of limitations; whether the contractual parties, the
government and the successful contractor, would continue to be bound
by a contract which, in an unusual case, might not be fully performed
when a court concluded that it had been illegally awarded; and
whether the remedy of contract cancellation should be retained as a
deterrent to future illegal agency action because, unlike a Court of
Claims judgment for damages, the expenditures for the cancelled con-
tract . as well as for the one which may replace it are charged to the
procuring agency's appropriations.'" However, if any of these ques-
tions do in fact present genuine problems, they could be resolved by
the same legislation which would amend the APA or the procurement
statutes to substitute the remedy of damages for the remedy of contract
cancellation. An appropriately short statute of limitations could be
- 218 Judgments awarded by the Court of Claims are satisfied from an appropriation
for that particular purpose.
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'established. The obligations of the parties to the contract could be
left intact regardless of the outcome in a suit brought by a third party
to challenge the legality of the contract. The deterrent effect of the
remedy of damages could be increased by providing that such judg-
ments in the Court of Claims be satisfied out of money appropriated
to the procuring agency in the year the judgment is rendered.'"
Another consequence of substituting the remedy of damages is
that an unsuccessful offeror who cannot demonstrate that he would
have been eligible for the contract had proper procurement procedures
been followed, could not prove a loss of anticipated profits and would
be limited to recovering his bid preparation expenses on an implied
contract theory. Many would not regard this result as a drawback to
the remedy of damages, since the injury to such a bidder seems clearly
speculative. However, this group of unsuccessful offerors probably
would include all those whose complaints of inadequate oral or written
discussions were considered in the Comptroller General's decisions
discussed above. Judging from those decisions, one could conclude that
the mandate of Congress for competition in negotiated procurement
has proved to be no mandate at all, and will not become one until
some administrative or judicial tribunal requires its enforcement. A
second group of unsuccessful offerors who would not have an adequate
remedy if only suits for anticipated profits were permitted are firms
which are only potential bidders. Like Ballerina, their injury in one
sense is speculative, but on the other hand, these firms may be most
seriously harmed because in some cases the government action at issue
will foreclose their competing for many or all future government con-
tracts.
With respect to the injuries alleged by unsuccessful offerors who
cannot prove a loss of anticipated profits, or by other unsuccessful
offerors who simply cannot afford the expense of a law suit, much
reliance must be placed in the hope for improved procedures before
the Comptroller General. There can be no doubt that the Comptroller
is fully cognizant of the Scanwell line of decisions and its potential
effect on both the substance of his decisions and the procedures by
which they are, reached. These procedures should be amended to
encourage the issuance of his decisions before a contract is awarded
so that remedial action would be more feasible. For example, except
in cases where the head of an agency determines that an immediate
award is necessary to the national interest the Comptroller has recom-
mended that no award should be made until five days after the con-
214 Since the damages are related to profits rather than costs, the amount deducted
from the appropriations will he painful to the agency but may not seriously disrupt its
programs as the cost incident to contract cancellation certainly would.
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tracting agency has submitted a report to his office and has discussed
the matter with the officials in his office. 215
Also, it is necessary that these procedures provide some mech-
anism for at least selectively reviewing the allegations of fact presented
to the Comptroller by the procuring agency. At present, these allega•
tions are accepted by his office as undisputed unless proof to the
contrary is virtually overwhelming.216 Finally, the Comptroller may
have to be more willing than he has been in the past to take effective
action against improperly awarded contracts which do not concern the
defense, security, safey or health of the nation. 217
The possibility of improving the procedure for protesting contract
awards to the Comptroller General may suggest that court actions for
damages or any other remedy will become altogther unnecessary. How-
ever, this situation is highly unlikely. In order to be effective, the
Comptroller or any other administrative tribunal will be compelled,
under whatever procedures are adopted, to issue decisions before the
contract is awarded. The dispatch with which such decisions must be
issued will require abbreviated procedures which will not compare
with the discovery, procedural safeguards and adversary hearings
which are only afforded by use of the judicial process. Moreover, it is
probable that only such review as is available in a court of law is
commensurate with the importance to our economy of government
procurements, particularly those procurements involving the defense,
security, safety or health of the nation which should not be subjected
to the risk of cancellation.
Restricting the judicial review of government contracts to suits
for damages only, appears to be the most promising compromise be-
tween the chaos of unrestricted review and the potentially arbitrary
exercise of executive power in the allocation of $50 billion. 218 Indeed,
if the chaos is to be avoided and any judicial review retained, it may
be the only workable compromise short of judicial sophistry. Thus, it
is submitted that, despite its limitations, legislation restricting an
unsuccessful offeror's remedy to one for damages presents the most
215
 Hearings on H.R. 474 to establish a Commission on Government Procurement,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 685.
218
 See, e.g., 42 Comp. Gen. 124, 134 (1962), and decisions cited therein.
217 See note 164 supra.
218 The substitution of damages In lieu of other affirmative relief against the govern-
ment in its contracting capacity has a long-standing legislative precedent. See 12 Gov't.
Cont. If 255 Note, July 27, 1970, in which the author suggests the relevance of 28 U.S.C.
1498 to suits against government contracts. The cited Code provision establishes that
where a government contractor uses someone else's patented invention in performing the
contract, the patent owner cannot sue to enjoin its use but must sue the government for
compensation.
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viable approach to a complex problem having no perfect solution. Such
an amendment to the APA or the procurement statutes, if adopted,
together with the increased effectiveness of the Comptroller General's
office, will best safeguard the interests of contractors, the government
and the public at large.
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